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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HYRUM WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.

7471

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case and the statement of facts
as contained and recited in appellant's brief are, in the
main, correct, but in some instances the appellant has mis_stated certain facts and in other instances appellant has
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included some measure of argument in connection with his
statement of facts. In admitting the appellant's statement
of facts to be substantially correct respondent of course
does ndadmit argumentative matters included in such statement of facts.
Respondent will follow appellant's method of designating citations from the testimony with the page and the indication R-1 or R-2 showing whether the record refers to
the transcript from the first trial or from the second trial.
The issues and the facts supporting them as contained
in the pleadings and shown by the evidence in this case are
fairly simple. Hyrum Williams, a long-time employe of
· The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, had under
his charge three switches-two immediately to the west
and one a short distance to the east of the river bridge
where the Union Pacific main lines cross the Weber River.
During his shift of eight hours 8 or 10 trains passed these
switches, for only 6 or 7 of which trains was the plaintiff
required to change or manipulate the switches for such
movements. The plaintiff thus was not required to change
or align the switches "every time" any train moved over
the tracks as stated by appellant on page 4 of his brief, but
would align the switches for 6 or 7 out of the 8 or 10 movements (R. 76-1.)
On the morning of December 9, 1946, shortly after he
reported for work and while attempting .to manipulate the
middle, or No.2 of the three switches, Mr. Williams slipped
and fell and broke the large bone of his left leg about three
inches below the knee. He testified that he stood on the
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switch ties while trying to manipulate the switch; that the
left tie was covered with ice and slippery. At the top. of
page 6 of his brief appellant states that it was below freezing; however, Exhibits L, M and 13 show the temperature
above freezing for a 10-hour period prior to the time of the
accident, the temperature ranging between 33° and 35°.
Admittedly, this was near freezing and for a short period
of time, prior to 10 to 12 hours before the accident, the
temperature did get slightly below freezing (See Ex. M).
Appellant in his statement of facts on page 8 states
that plaintiff had seen other men stand on the switch ties in
manipulating the switch on frequent occasions, as had
Beckett who testified for plaintiff. The record is not entirely clear concerning plaintiff's own testimony other than
repetitions of the statement that there was no regular or
customary way to throw a switch, nor any rules or regulations with respect to how such a switch should be thrown
(R. 46-49-2). Plaintiff did not directly testify that he had
seen the other men standing on the switch ties to manipulate
the switch but merely said he had seen other men manipulate these switches and then added that there was, no customary or regular way to do so. As for his witness Beckett,
the direct question was asked of Beckett concerning his
manipulating of such switches, "Do you, yourself, place
your feet on those switch ties?" (R. 137-2), to which he
answered directly and positively, "No sir." On being further
pressed by counsel for plaintiff Beckett said that in closing
the switch ".You would come back toward the tie and it
would naturally put your feet in position to come in contact
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with the tie." But nowhere did Beckett say that he stood
on the ties to throw the switch and the only direct answer
upon the question given by him was the answer as stated
above, "No sir." When Beckett was questioned as to whether
he had seen other men throwing this or similar switches
from a position on the ties he evaded answering the question
directly and again said, "As you align the switch back to
the main line you will naturally,-your feet naturally 'come
over toward the tie, the switch ties which hold the switch
stand" (R. 138-2).
Counsel for appellant in referring to the testimony, as
well as in his argument concerning plaintiff's Requested
Instruction No. 4, talks about sprinkling of sand or salt
on the ties ·or in the area of the switch, and on the bottom
of page 9 and the top of page 10 he refers to the fact that
no salt or sand had been thrown around in the area, although
at other areas of the yard there was salt and sand provided.
Counsel misstates the record in that respect because now here in the record is there any evidence of any sand being
~used anywhere around the vicinity of switches. Mr. Williams admitted (R. 107-2) that there had been no salt used
around the switches or ties in question in all the years that
he had worked there, although he understood that there was
salt used at some other switches in the yard. Beckett testified that salt was used at other places in the Ogden Yard,
particularly· in the vicinity of the slip switches (R. 140-2).
He admitted, however, that the so-called slip or ball switches
do not have electrically controlled switches for the operation of semaphores (R. 150-2), and it was admitted that the
\
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switch in question was a main line switch with bonded
wires from which the switch points operated main line
semaphores. Neither Beckett nor Williams gave any evidence concerning sand being used in connection with these
or any other switches. In spite of that, counsel for appellant
insisted on injecting the question of the use of both salt
and sand in the area of the switches in question.
With respect to the progress and recovery of Mr. Williams after the cast was placed on his broken leg, appellant
inadvertently or otherwise again misstates the record.
Near the top of page 12 of appellant's brief it is stated that
on February 20, 1947, x-rays revealed callus formation and
early incomplete bony union. Appellant is in error in that
. st;J,tement because the x-ray which refers to the incomplete
bony union was an x-ray taken on January 31, 1947, and on
the same page (R. 29-1) the doctor who was testifying from
the x-rays so stated that the January 31 x-rays showed an
incomplete bony union, but with respect to the x-ray taken
on February 20 the doctor stated, "By that time there was
a good bone union" ( R. 29-1) .

ARGUMENT
In appellant's brief, although ten separate statements
of error are. set forth, appellant combines some of such
statements of error and argues on six points. In such argument appellant has overlapped and has argued upon the
same charge or error under more than one of his designated
points. Respondent will address its argument to the same
six points as specified by appellant. In appellant's state-
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ment of errors he lists ten separate statements wherein he
charges the trial court with error. However, with respect
to such statements of error he does not argue anything with
respect to paragraphs numbered 3, 5 and 8. We therefore
assume that by failing to argue upon such claimed errors
appellant has waived them.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL FOLLOWING THE FIRST TRIAL. (Appellant's
Statement of Points 9)
It is rather interesting to note that in this case counsel
who appear for the plaintiff, Hyrum Williams, find themselves on the opposite side of the question to that which they
recently argued before this court in the case of King v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 212 P. (2d) 692, decided by this court
within the past year. In that case the, jury in the trial court
had returned a verdict in favor of the defendant "no cause
of action" and the trial court, at plaintiff's request, granted
a motion for a new trial. The jury on the second trial of the
case returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $75,000.00, which, however, was reduced by the court to $50,000.00. Counsel who now represent respondent in this case
represented the appellant i~ that case and argued that the
trial court had abused its discretion in granting the new
trial. Such position was, of course, strenuously opposed by
counsel who are counsel for plaintiff herein and in their
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brief and in arguing upon the case the same counsel argued
very strenuously and with good effect that the trial court
had a wide range of discretion in acting upon a motion for
new trial. We wish now to call those same matters to the
attention of the same counsel and of this court and strenuously insist that the trial court in this case was acting justifiably within a discretion committed to him when he granted
a new trial after the original jury's verdict.
We admit the law as quoted by counsel from Utah
Code Annotated on page 18 of appellant's brief and respondent will likewise quote and adopt the holding of this court in
the case of Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 44 .Utah 100, 138 P.
1185. We will not requote as much .from that case as counsel for appellant has, but do wish to call the following to the
court's attention as stated by this court therein:

"* * * A court, vacating a verdict and
granting a new trial by merely setting up his
opinion or judgment against that of a jury, but
usurps judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury. Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the
Code that a new trial on motion of the aggrieved
party may be granted by the court below on the
ground of 'excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.'
Whenever that is made to OJfJtpear, the court, when
its action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the verdict aside and grant a new
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that, it
should clearly be made to appear that the jury totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law by which
the damages were· to be regulated, or wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by
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so doing committed gross and palpable error by
rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous or
unjust as to be attributable to neither the charge
nor the evidence, but only to passion or prejudice.
Whether a new tria~ should or should not be granted
on this ground, of necessity, must largely rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court." (Italics
ours.)
In determining whether or not the trial court exercised
a sound judicial discretion or abused his discretion we must
look to the facts given in evidence in the case and must bear
in mind that the trilal court had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses as they testified, and particularly had the
·opportunity to observe the plaintiff, Mr. Williams; his manner of testifying; his manner of moving in and out and
around the courtroom; and the inconvenience, if any, which
he still suffered in view of the fact that he testified that
even at the time of the. trial he could not do the work required of him in tending these switches to let 6 or 7 trains
pass by them during an 8-hour shift (R. 55-1). In considering this evidence we must remind counsel that the verdict
of the jury was not $12,000.00 but that the original jury's
verdict was for $20,000.00, the total amount prayed for by
plaintiff. We must keep in mind that the injury suffered by
Williams while it was a broken leg-yes, one bone of the
lower leg broken in two places, yet there was no disproportioning of the bone-bone shift. The bone appeared to be
perfectly straight ( R. 25-1) , and after the cast was put on
the doctor testified that the x-ray "shows the fragment of
the tip in excellent position and alignment" (R. 28-1, 34-1).
It is true that the original cast placed on the leg was re-
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moved about March 25, 1947 and had to be replaced on May
26, 1947. However, on February 20th there was a good bone
union and the cast was left on until March 25th, and after
the cast was removed on March 25th the plaintiff was
walking with a cane and the doctor at that time said that he
should be able to return to work in 7 to 10 days (R. 30-1).
In spite of that fact something happened and on May 26th
when an x-ray was taken a fracture line appeared in the
leg and another cast was put on. True, Williams testified
that he had not had any subsequent injury, and while defendant had no testimony to show that he had suffered any
subsequent injury, we do not think that Williams' testimony
as thus given must be believed at all events, particularly in
view of the fact that after his release after the cast was
removed on March 25th, even though the doctor did see him
from time to time thereafter, "it was not until May when
he came back and·complained of the excess pain" (R. 39-1).
Williams insisted, even up to the time of the trial, that he
could not do the work of handling those switches eventhough such a job was considered as a "pension job" (R.
74-2), and yet the doctor testified: "On October 3, 1947 my
records show he was released for work. We talked it over
with Hyrum and agreed that the case was finished and
closed and it was O.K. to return to work" (R. 34-1). The
doctor stated that Williams' recovery was a good recovery
· and entirely normal and on his release it was the opinion
of the doctor that Williams could have done any work that
he had done before (R. 35-1). This evidence was all before
the trial court and during the giving of it the court was able
to observe not only the doctor and other witnesses who

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
testified, but also was able to observe Williams and see
how he was able to get about, to come and go, and to evaluate
the testimony from the standpoint of personalities as well
as from the cold facts of the record.
Counsel for appellant insist that plaintiff's lost wages
aloNe up to the time of the trial amounted to $3,900.00. In
that respect we must advise counsel that the record is not
clear as to what his lost wages would amount to over any
period of time. Williams testified that his average wage
was $250.00 to $260.00 a month, but that was not his takehome pay-that ~vas before deductions (R. 56-1). There is
nothing in the record anywhere to show what his deductions
were or what the net amount of his take-home pay was.
Also, Williams took· his retirement in October of 1947 and
there is nothing in the record to show what his retirement
pay was, whether he received as a result of his long years of
service 50% of his normal pay, or more, or less. Therefore
there is nothing in the record to show what Williams lost
by way of wages and the most that can be done is to speculate with respect thereto and upon such speculation we
can conclude that up to the time when he took his retirement he had been off work for approximately ten months,
during which time he would have received something less
than $2,500.00 (minimizing deductions that would have
been taken from his pay-check). 'Thus, instead of having.
lost wages in the amount of $3,900.00, Williams' lost wages
would be somewhere closer to the figure of $2,500.00. On
that basis, with the court stating as he did that $5,000.00
should have been sufficient total damages even assuming
I
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negligence on the part of the defendant, it would leave to
'Villiams $2,500.00 for lost wages and $2,500.00 for his pain
and suffering, the 40 7c cut from the $5,000.00 being based
on contributory negligence attributable to Williams as found
by the jury.
Again we must remind counsel that the original jury's
verdict was $20,000.00, and with lost wages of somewhere
in the neighborhood of $2,500.00, that would have left $17,500.00 for pain and suffering with a very serious q~estion
having been raised as to whether or not the second cast
necessitated on Williams' leg was a result o~ an additional
injury suffered after the doctor had originally released him
on March 25th, with no complaint from him until May 23rd.
It is interesting to note that counsel state on page 24
of appellant's brief, "Had the court reduced the verdict by
a lesser sum perhaps a different situation would have been
presented." By such a statement counsel, in effect, admit
that the original verdict of $20,000.00 was high and although the court may have been justified in reducing it
counsel, in effect, argue that he should not have reduced it
as much as he did. We will ask counsel if they admit that
the $20,000.00 verdict was excessive, and will ask again
what their suggestion might have been had the court presented a different situation by reduci:Q.g the verdict by a
lesser sum. The amount of $20,000.00 was the amount that
plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel asked in their pleadings
and after the first trial they did not change the request
but left it at the $20,000.00, and now counsel admit that
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a different question would have been presented had the
court reduced the verdict by a lesser sum.
Throughout all of their argument on Point I counsel
for appellant take the attitude that a new trial deprived
the pla1ntiff of the right to recover what he thought he
was entitled to. The plaintiff was not forced to take the $3,000.00 to which the -court reduced the judgment after deducting for contributory negligence. He was given the alternative of a new trial and counsel insist that he was denied
justice by being given the right to a new trial.
It may be possible that in exercising his discretion in
attempting to cut the amount of the original jury's verdict
the Judge did assume a figure that was somewhat too low,
but that would not say the original figure as submitted by
the jury was not too high. Nevertheless, the mere granting
of a new trial as an alternative is a mode of saving plaintif~so that he can start over again if the court, in his opinion,
places the amount too low. If, in every case where the
court concludes that the damages were excessive, the trial
court could reduce the amount and compel the plaintiff to
take such an amount, then a plaintiff or appellant in such a
position as appellant occupies here might at times find
himself. in a position where a court in evaluating the evidence might have placed an amount too low. Even under
such circumstances I do not believe that such a plaintiff or
appellant could urge that the court's action had been arbitrary or capricious. The honest judgment of one man or the
honest judgment of one Judge is not always the same as the
honest judgment of another, and that is one of the reasons

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
why a litigant is given the option in such cases of accepting
the reduced amount or taking a new trial. Upon the new
trial the plaintiff had as much chance as the defendant did
and the granting of a new trial did not deny substantial
justice to the plaintiff.
As is stated in the Jensen case, cited supra, whether
a new trial should or should not be granted, of necessity,
must largely rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court and in any case, any ruling made by the court with
opposing litigants must be against one or the other of such
litigants and it cannot be said that in every instance where
a Judge rules against one litigant that he does so because of
bias or prejudice on his own behalf or as a result of any abuse
of discretion. The power of trial courts to be able to control
the verdicts of juries to some extent should be maintained in
our system of jurisprudence. As was stated by the Appellate
Court of the State of California in' DuVall v. Boos Bros.
Cafeteria Co., 187 P. 767:
. "The trial court should be vigilant to set aside
verdicts where there is reason to believe passion,
prejudice or sympathy has influenced the jury."
In the case of Bonner v. Los Angeles Examiner, (Cal.)
62 P. (2d) 427, the California Appellate Court said:
"The granting of a new trial is a rna tter resting
so largely in the discretion of the trial court that its
action will not be disturbed upon appeal except upon
a manifest and unmistakable abuse. On appeal, every
presumption is in favor of the order, and the plaintiff must show affirmatively that the order was
erroneous. Rosenberg v. George A. Moore & Co.,
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194 Cal. 392, 396, 229 P. 34. It has been said and
quoted over and over again that 'it is only in rare
instances and upon very strong grou:p.ds that the
- supreme court will set aside an order granting a
new trial.' 2 Cal. J ur. 905, and cases cited. This
rule arises largely from the fact that the order
granting a new trial does not finally dispose of the
case, but le'aves it for retrial upon the merits.

*

*

*

*

*

"On appeal from such an order, however, an
appellate court will not disturb the order if there
is a reasonable or fairly debatable justi!ication for
it. It has been said and often quoted 'that the trial
court. should be vigilant to set aside verdicts where
there is reason to believe. that passion, prejudice or
sympathy has influenced the jury to give more than
the facts reasonably warrant. No definite rule can
be announced as to when a verdict is or is not so
excessive within these rules, but it is settled that an
order granting a new trial for excessive damages
will not be disturbed if there is a reasonable or fairly debatable justification therefor."
This court has had occasion to pass upon the question
of the granting or refusing of new trials in several recent
cases. In the case of Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Institution, ... Utah ... , 197 P. (2d) 136, this court said:
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of
·any serious dispute that the question of granting or
denying a motion for a new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. * * *
This court cannot substitute its discretion for that
of the trial court. * * * We do not ordinarily
interfere with rulings of the trial court in ·either
granting or denying a motion for a new trial, and
unless abuse of or failure to exercise discretion on
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the part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained."
In the case of K-ing v. Union Pacific R. Co., 212 P. (2d)
692, ... Utah ... , which 've have already referred to, this
court had the question squarely presented to it because the
sole error assigned in that case was that the court had
abused its discretion in granting a new trial after the jury
had returned a verdict of no cause of action. In that case
this court referred not only to prior Utah cases but to numerous cases from other jurisdictions. It referred to and
quoted from the California case of Rose v. Carter, 84 P.
(2d) 174, to the effect that the order of a trial court in ·
either granting or denying a new trial will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it appears that there was a manifest abuse
of discretion.
I

Also to the Oklahoma case of Belford v. Allen, 86 P.
(2d) 676, wherein the court held:
"Where the evidence is conflicting the trial
judge has the duty to weigh the evidence and to approve· or disapprove the verdict, and if the verdict is
such that in the opinion of the trial court it should
not be permitted to stand, and it is such that he
cannot conscientiously approve it and believes it
should be for the opposite party, it is his duty to set
it aside for a new trial."
In the King case, cited supra, it was contended by the
defendant, "That if a trial judge is allowed to set aside a
verdict returned by a jury which is supported by substantial
competent evidence, there results an infringement upon its
right to trial by jury." That is very similar to the position

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
taken by counsel for appellant in this case, as appellant
argues that substantial rights were denied plaintiff because
the court reduced the amount of the judgment, or, in the
alternative, required the plaintiff to accept a new trial. As
this court said in the King case, supra:.
"There is no merit in this contention.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

" 'Trial by jury' * * * is a trial by a jury
of 12 men in the presence and under the superin~
tendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on
the law and to ad vise them of the facts, and (except
on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their
verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or
the evidence.'
"In Whitfield v. De Brincat, 35 Cal. App. 2d
47 6, 96 P. 2d 156, the court declared that the constitutional right in certain proceedings to have issues
determined by a jury is subject to the wide discretion of the trial court, and that the rule that the
trial judge, when convinced that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the verdict or that the weight
of the evidence is against the decision, should grant
a new trial, is a salutary one for the protection of
litigants."
At the conclusion of his argument on Point I appellant
charges the court with "utter and complete disregard for the
uncontroverted evidence presented by plaintiff." We cannot understand what appellant means by such a charge and
what he means by the phrase "uncontroverted evidence."
It is true that the fact that plaintiff suffered the injury of
a broken leg, with attendant pain and suffering, was not
controverted. The question as to the amount of, damage
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claimed by plaintiff, ho\vever, was controverted. Plaintiff
alleged in his complaint that he had been damaged in the
amount of $20,000.00, which charge was denied by defendant. The only evidence giving any monetary basis upon
which the jury could figure plaintiff's damages was that
plaintiff's average wage had ,been $250.00 per month before
deductions, and prior to his retirement October 15, 1947.
The amount of the deductions was not shown and the
amount of his retirement pay was not shown. The question
as to defendant's liability was very seriously controverted
and very fully controverted by the evidence. As was said
by this court in the King case, supra, at page 698:
"\\Te cannot agree with the trial judge that the

evidence is 'uncontroverted' in· the two respe·cts
mentioned by him in his decision. However, as has
been pointed out, it is not necessary that the evidence be uncontroverted in favor of the moving party
before the trial court can grant a new· trial."
There is one point which we think counsel for appellant
have overlooked in their argument, and that is, the fact that
the trial court could have granted a new trial without requiring any remission from the verdict as given by the
original jury. A trial court is not limited in such cases
in granting new trials. We may admit that reasonable men
might differ as to whether a $5,000.00 verdict would have
been sufficient as the trial judge insisted in his ruling on
the motion for a new trial. At the same time, we feel that
most reasonable men would not disagree on the proposition
that $20,000.00, the amount of the original verdict, was
excessive in all events.
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This court has had before it a similar question recently in the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, .. Utah .. , 218 P. (2d) 1080. In that case this. court
ordered a remittitur where the trial court had refused toreduce the damages allowed by the jury, and in the event the
plaintiff failed to accept the remittitur this court ordered
that a new trial be granted. In that case the jury returned a
verdict of $12,500.00. The evidence showed, $1,300.00
loss of wages, and in deciding as above t:Q.is court stated:
"We must assume that the jury awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,300.00 for loss of wages, which
were his only established special damages, and this
leaves the sum of $11,200.00 for general damages.
When we get in this domain reasonable min~s differ
as to what amount is excessive. However, there
must be a limit beyond which a reasonable jury cannot go and the limit must be determined on the gross
amount of the verdict and not the net amount."

in

This court concluded that the damages as a'¥arded by
the jury were "so -grossly excessive and exorbitant as to
convince the members of this court that the verdict is far
in excess of what a reasonable jury could determine as a
maximum amount awardable for this type of injury. For
these reasons it appears to us to have been given under the
influence of passion and prejudice."
In the case at bar, disregarding the question raised as
to how or in what manner the second break occurred in
Williams' leg, and considering the ten months up to the
time when he should have gone back to work but chose to
take his retirement instead, the total wages lost to plaintiff
in his take-home pay would have been something less than
$2,500.00. Considering the total verdict of $20,000.00, this
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would have left $17,500.00 for general damages. Even if
we assume, as counsel state, that up to the time of trial
he had lost $3,900.00 in wages (which cannot be assumed
because the amount of his pension was not shown), still
that would leave in excess of $16,000.00 as general damages.
Clearly the same can be said in this case, as was in the Duffy
case, "There must be a limit beyond which a reasonabl~ jury
cannot go and the limit must be determined on the gross
amount of the verdict and not the net amount."
We submit that Judge Hendricks was honest in the
exercise of his discretion and in concluding that the jury's
verdict of $20,000.00 in this case was excessive. The plaintiff was not required to accept the amount as remitted by
the Judge and the fact that a new trial was granted does
not infringe upon plaintiff's right to trial by jury, as this
court decided in the King case, supra.
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err
in granting defendant's motion for a new trial following the
first trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 4 AND 5, MATTERS IN SAID REQUESTS WHICH WERE
PROPER HAVING BEEN OTHERWISE GIVEN IN SUBSTANCE. (Appellant's Statement of
Points 1 and 2.)
We do not dispute as a general proposition the law referred to by counsel for appellant in their argument under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

Point No. II, because we admit that "each party to a suit
is entitled to have his theory, when there is evidence to
sustain it, submitted to the jury * * *" In accepting
that law, we want to remind counsel for the appellant that
the law also is to the effect, as sated in the case of Toone
v. J. P. O'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16, that:

"* * * The court was not bound to charge
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover
the question in one without offending against appellant's rights."
In the case at bar the court briefly and in simple
language stated both the theory of plaintiff and the theory
of defendant in Instruction No. 9.
It will be noted that in each of the cases cited by counsel under their Point No. II, that the question was raised
because the court had refused to give certain instructions
requested by counsel. We think that appellant's counsel in
this case must admit that if no specific instructions on any
particular point are requested, then error cannot be charged
against the court for failure to instruct upon such point.
It will also be noted that the court in several, if not most
of such cases, contrary to appellant's argument, held that the
theories of each had been given. In the Toone case, above
referred to, the court had modified one of appellant's requests, and in ruling upon the matter wherein appellant
had contended its theory had not been properly presented,
it was stated :
_ "Appellant's theory of the evidence was sufficiently covered by what the court told the jury, and
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hence it was not prejudiced by the court's modification referred to."

As a preface to our argument upon this point, we wish
to call the attention of the court and counsel to two rules of
law. One is that if a request is in part incorrect, or it is
· · · · ~ · inappropriate if applied to the 'facts, the court commits no
. error in wholly refusing it. The court is not required. to
weed out and reject the bad and give only the good part.
The request must be correct in all respects.

Yenot· et ux. v. Spokane United Rys., 255 P. 947.
Wiley v. Young, 174 P. 316.
Colburn v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 6 P. (2d)
635.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 11 P. (2d)
142.
MacDonald v. Calkins, 251 P. 458.
The second proposition we wish to refer to is that "the
general rule is that unless the party requests an instruction
on a special matter, he cannot predicate error upon the
court's failure to charge."

State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P. (2d) 727.
Taylor v. L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 61 Utah 5~24, 2il6·
P. 239.
In the Miller case this court stated:
"Our Utah Code provides that in a criminal
trial, 'When the evidence is concluded the court must
charge the jury as in ci vii actions.' Sec. 105-32-1 ( 5) ,
U. C. A. 1943. In civil actions Sec. 104-24-14 ( 4),
U. C. A. 1943, provides that, 'When the evidence is
.concluded the court shall instruct the jury in writing
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upon the law applicable to the case, * * *.' This
requirement that the court instruct 'upon the law
applicable to the case' does not place upon the court
alone the burden of making up instructions which
cover every question which may have arisen in the
case.''
In this connection it is interesting to note that the
trial court accepted and used the help given him by both
counsel in their requests, and keeping in mind the rule last
stated, we would like to look at the requests as submitted
by plaintiff and see which of those requests were actually
given by the court. Plaintiff requested only six instructions.
The entire content of plaintiff's requested Instruction No.1
was contained and given in the court's Instruction No. 2.
Plaintiff~s requested Instruction No. 2 was also embodied
in and given in the court's Instruction No. 2. Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 3 was given verbatim as the court's
Instruction No. 8. Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 6
was given almost verbatim as the court's Instruction No.
22. This leaves only plaintiff's requested Instruction No.
4 and No.5 as not being given directly and almost verbatim,
and as shown by the endorsements of the court thereon, it
was at least the trial court's opinion that he had given the
substance of them-at least they were so given in so far
as the same were applicable to the evidence in the case.
Instruction No. 4 as requested by plaintiff was and
would have been entirely improper for the court to give.
That 'instruction in effect would have told the jury to, or
would have authorized them to find the defendant negligent
if they found "that defendant failed and neglected to render
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such (plaintiff's) footing safe by sprinkling salt or sand
in the area of said switch * * *." Such an instruction
would have been entirely improper under the pleadings and
evidence in the case. No negligence was charged in the
pleadings for failure to use salt or sand, neither having been
mentioned in the pleadings at all. The defendant's witnesses testified that neither salt nor sand was ever used
around these switches and that it would be improper to do
so (R. 172, 174, 175, 181, 211-2). One of plaintiff's witnesses did testify that salt had been made available at some
of the S\vitch shanties elsewhere in the Ogden yard, but
none had ever been available at these switches, and plaintiff himself not only testified that none had ever been used at
these switches but also that he had never requested any
here (R. 78-1). The switches in the yard where salt had
been used were not switches connected up with or controlling electric semaphore circuits (R. 175, 176-2), and
testimony of the defendant's witnesses was undisputed that
not only was salt not used at these electrically activated
switches but it was improper and against the rules to use
it (R. 181, 211-2). None had ever been used at this switch
to plaintiff's own knowledge (R. 44, 45-1) (R. 107-2).
None of plaintiff's witnesses testified that sand had been
used or that it would have been proper to use it. -On the
other hand, the defendant's witnesses testified that it would
have been improper to use sand and that it was never done,
and the section foreman gave the reason stating that if sand
were used it would soon fill up the pores in the gravel ballast
so that the melting snows or surface waters would puddle
and not seep away into the ballast (R. 175, 211-2).
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Before Instruction No. 4 would have been proper, it
would have been necessary for the court to reframe it. It
would have been necessary to eliminate any question with
respect to sand and it would also have been necessary to
add another instruction directing or authorizing the jury
to find from the conflicting evidence whether it was usual
or proper to have, or whether reasonable care under the
circumstances required defendant to have salt available,
and if they found in the affirmative then whether under
the circumstances in this case the defendant was negligent
in not having salt available at this particular switch. The
requested instruction did not embody the facts of this case
as it should have done and would have been tantamount to
directing the jury to find the defendant negligent if the
jury should find that no salt had been made available or
used in the area without considering the other circumstances,
or that they could find the defendant negligent if no sand
was available or sprinkled in the area where neither pleadings nor evidence warranted any such reference to the use
of sand.
I

IF AN INSTRUCTION 'AS REQUESTED IS NOT
PROPER AND DOES~ NOT FIT THE FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO IN A .CASE, THE PARTY REQUESTING
SUCH AN INSTRUCTION CANNOT ASSIGN ERROR
BECAUSE TI-IE COURT FAILED' TO REFRAME OR
REMODEL THE INSTRUCTION TO FIT THE FACTS
OF THE CASE. Again we say that plaintiff's witnesses
gave no testimony whatsoever with respect to the use of
sand, and the only evidence concerning the use of sand
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showed that it 'vas improper and never done; and the only
evidence with respect to salt showed that it had never
been used at switches of this type and had never been requested. In spite of this, the appellant now claims that
the court should have given his requested Instruction No.
4, which would have told the jury they could find the defendant negligent if the defendant had failed. to "sprinkle
salt or sand in the area of such switch." The court did not
err in refusing to give the instruction as requested but it
would have been error for the court to have given such instructiqn.
See Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P. (2d)
111, wherein this court said:
"The court's statutory duty (Section 104-2414(4), U. C. A. 1943) to instruct 'upon the law applicable to the case' pertains, to the 'case' made by
the evidence in support of .the allegations in issue.
Ordinarily to instruct on the law applicable to evidence which did not support allegations upon whieh
issue was joined or which supported theories outside
of the scope of the pleadings would be erroneous

* * *"
See also:

Fowler v. M_edical Arts Bldg., 112 Utah 367,
188 P. (2d) 711.
State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead,
82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612.
Appellant has gone to some length in his brief after
quoting the cases to argue that plaintiff's theory of the
case was not adequately presented. We would like to ask
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wherein the plaintiff or his counsel was in any way hampered in his discussions with the jury in expounding his
theory of the case or his argument because plaintiff's theory
of the case had not been covered. There was nothing in the
instructions which detracted from plaintiff's theory or
which prevented plaintiff's counsel from taking full advantage of any argument before the jury which they may
have desired in connection with that theory, and as a matter of fact, plaintiff's counsel repeated and stressed and
reiterated the fact of the freezing weather, the snow and
ice in the area, and the claim that it was proper for the
plaintiff to stand on the switch ties to throw the switch.
In the discussion had with the court concerning the
instructions as they were given to the jury, and immediately
following the court's instructing the jury and before argument, counsel did not complain that plaintiff's theory was
not presented nor properly covered. After reading the instructions to the jury, the following passed between court
and counsel :
THE COURT: I will ask ·you gentlemen if you
observe any error of an elemental nature that you
want to call to the Court's attention at this time or
if you desire to take any exceptions that you want to
argue to the Court.
MR. MINER: I have -none.
MR. BLACK: We have none, Your Honor (R.
229-2).
After which it was agreed that exceptions would be
taken after the argument and plaintiff's counsel were
directed to proceed with their argument to the jury.
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Even after argument when exceptions were taken,
counsel, although they did take some exceptions, only ser-.
iously urged an objection to one instruction. That was to
Instruction No. 19 as the court had given it, and the court
made a correction in that instruction and called the jury
back and gave a substituted instruction to them, with which
counsel seemed to be entirely satisfied.
With respect to this question of presenting plaintiff's
theory to the jury, let us inquire just what plaintiff's theory
was. We think plaintiff's theory can best be summarized
by the words of counsel starting with the third line from the
top on page 73 of appellant's brief, stating:

"* * * The specific act of negligence relied
on by plaintiff is that defendant, by and through its
authorized agents, servants and employees, knew, or
in the exercise of ordinary care should have known,
that the weather was at freezing point -and that slush
and snow around the switch where plaintiff was injured would be frozen and would render footing
dangerous and unsafe and that defendant failed and
neglected to make said footing reasonably safe by
cleaning the ice and snow off the place where switch
tenders would, in the ordinary performance of their
duties, be required to stand, move or walk, and that
said negligent conduct proximately caused, in whole
or in part, the injuries to plaintiff."
It is interesting to note that in this statement, which
is the exact statement of theory used by appellant in arguing on the motion for new trial before the, trial court, appellant does not follow plaintiff's request No. 4 completely,
and particularly will it be noted that appellant in such state-
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ment eliminates all reference to salt and sand as was contained in request No. 4.
Even if such a statement had been put before the court
in a formal request to give to the jury, there would have
to he either a modification or an additional instruction to
enable the jury to determine whether the place in question
was the place where the "switch tenders would, in the
ordinary performance of their duties, be required to stand."
But assuming that such a statement had been presented in
a request, which it was not, how would it have compared
with what the court did tell the jury? The words "by and
through its authorized agents, servants, and employees,"
and anything that such words could convey, were fully covered by the court's Instruction No. 8, and Instruction No.
8 was plaintiff's request No. 3 given verbatim. Does the
statement that there was "slush and snow around the switch"
and that the weather was "at freezing point," which "would
render footing dangerous and unsafe" state anything more
or different than w~s stated by the court where he said.
that the plaintiff claimed "that the defendant allowed the
ties on which the switch was located to become * * *
covered with snow and ice, which caused them to be in a
slick and slippery and unsafe condition?" There would not
be ice unless the weather was at freezing point.
Do the words "that the defendant failed and neglected
to make said footing reasonably safe by cleaning the ice and
snow off" say any more than what the court stated, "that
the defendant al'lowed the ties * * * to become and
remain covered with snow and ice, which caused them to be
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in a slick and slippery and unsafe condition?" Without
adopting the exact words which appellant now uses in his
brief, but which he never used in any request, the court
could not have stated much more definitely the position of
the plaintiff than he did in the short, concise statement as
given in Instruction No. 9.
In Instruction No. 8 the court very definitely advised
the jury that an employer was liable for the negligent acts or
omissions of any of its employes, and that if the negligence
of any such employes contributed in whole or in part to
proximately cause plaintiff's injury, then the negligence of
those employes becomes the negligence of the employer.
The court immediately followed with Instruction No. 9 informing the jury as above referred to. The court also in the
instructions-however in a later instruction-told the jury
that it was the duty of the railroad company to exercise
reasonable care to provide its employes with a reasonably
safe place to work. As a preface to the entire matter, the
court in its Instruction No. 2 gave' the substance of plain:tiff's requests as numbered 1 and 2, stating as a matter of
law that plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate
commerce and this was a case under the F. E. L.A. and that
the laws of the State of Utah and Workmen's Compensation
Laws were not applicable to the case. In Instruction No. 6
the court told the jury that they should disregard any attitudes or knowledge they may have gained from other cases
concerning the law of negligence applicable to other cases
and apply only what was given to them in these instructions,
and the law assumes that the jury follows the court's instruc~
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tions rather than assuming to the contrary. Ryan v. Beaver
County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. (2d) 858.
By the instructions which we have quoted and referred
to hereinabove, plaintiff's theory of the case as summarized
and stated by plaintiff's own counsel on page 73 of appellant's brief is as effectively put before the jury as it could
have been without quibbling over mere words.
Appellant argues at the bottom of page 27 of his brief
that the jury was not told that if they find the facts as set
forth in Instruction No. 9, they must find the issues in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Such a
statement is not true and such an instruction to the jury
would not be proper. There was no such absolute duty. The
jury could have found that it was not negligence on the
part of the defendant to fail to remove all ice and snow from
these switch ties. It was the plaintiff's theory that defendant allowed such snow or ice to accumulate on these switch
ties, and plaintiff's contended that such was negligence,
but even if the jury should find that the defendant had allowed snow and ice to remain on the ties, the jury still had
the right to decide whether or not the railroad company,
being charged to do what a reasonable man would have
done, was negligent in not anticipating that a switchman
would step on the icy t~es to throw the switch, and the jury
was entitled to decide whether even if plaintiff's theory
was true, such action on the part of the defendant amounted
to negligence. The Court could not direct that it would be
considered as negligence as a matter of law.
Plaintiff goes on to complain that the jury should have
been instructed that if the ties had become and had re-
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mained covered with snow and ice and slick and slippery,
and that such condition was a cause in whole or in part of
plaintiff's injuries, the jury should have found for plaintiff. Such an instruction would not have been proper because the jury would have had to find whether or not the
plaintiff was "required to locate himself" upon the ties
to do his work, and even then the jury should be the one to
decide whether allowing the ties to be in such condition
would be negligence rather than having the court direct
the jury that it was negligence as a matter of law. Appellant's counsel seem to proceed on the theory that if the
jury could have found that the ties were covered with ice
and snow and that the plaintiff slipped on those ties, that
t~en there was an absolute duty to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel g,ee only
one side of the case. They see only the point they are interested in and entirely overlook the fact that the jury was
entitled to determine the question as to whether or not it
was negligence fortle Defendant to fail to clean all snow and
ice from the ties and also whether it was. necessary, proper
or the usual thing to do to stand on the ties to throw the
switch, or whether the switch could have just as easily, conveniently, and more properly have been thrown from a
position where he would not have been standing on the ties.
The jury could have found that the ties were slick because
of the ice and snow and could still have found that such was
not ~egligence on the part of the defendant or_ that ··the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence to sueh an extent that his
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
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In all of what we have said we must again remind the
court and counsel that plaintiff is complaining that the jury
was not instructed so-and-so, and yet by including salt and
sand in his requested Instruction No. 4, plaintiff went further than his avowed theory and by including too much in
the request cannot charge error on the part of the court
for failure to give such a request.
There are numerous instances where the plaintiff could
have made requests of the court to give instructions which
would apply more specifically to some of the facts brought
out in evidence, both from plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses. The defendant submitted three times the number
of requests that the plaintiff did. Whether or not these requested instructions may have been helpful to the court in
framing his charge to the jury, the court, insofar as both
plaintiff and defendant were concerned, co~sidered that he
had given the substance of all such requests. It is rather
unfortunate perhaps, for both plaintiff and defendant, that
counsel does not have the time to prepare requested instructions after the evidence is all in. Becau~e of this fact it sometimes becomes necessary to anticipate what the evidence
will be, and there are few cases, if any, where the instructions as given cover and clearly reflect all the testimony
that has been given in a case in order to guide the jury in
its determination thereon. In this particular case the plaintiff had had the benefit of one prior trial and could have
changed his requests or submitted additional ones. Plaintiff's requests were substantially the same as on the first
trial, and the instructions as actually given to the jury were
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substantially the same on both the first and the second
trials, the only substantial change being the substitution
of an additional Instruction No. 19, which was done at the
request of plaintiff's counsel after the close of the argument.
The court cannot be accused of error if no instructions
are requested that fit the facts of a case and if it refuses
to give instructions that are broader than the pleadings or
the evidence, or if it attempts to frame in its own way instructions that may fit the evidence or to reframe some of
the instructions that may be reque~d to try and fit the
facts of the case.
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's Instruction No.
4 as requested was the same at the time of the first trial
as at the time of the second, and after knowing what the
evidence on the first trial was, (R. 78, 83, 102, 161, 162,
179-1) there was no justification whatsoever for including
any reference to sand in such request, and he could have
modified such instruction with respect to salt. At the first
trial such Instruction No. 4 was endorsed by the judge as
being given in part and in part refused (R. 034-1). In spite
of the experience on the first trial and the apparent knowledge of what the testimony would be, counsel for plaintiff
insisted on including the question of sand in their request
No. 4 on the second trial although there was an entire lack
of pleading or evidence to justify the same.
Under his argument on Point II, plaintiff complains
of the court's refusal to give his requested Instruction No.
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5. Said request No. 5 contained two paragraphs, the first
of which was given almost verbatim in the court's Instruction No. 20, and appellant cannot be heard to quibble over
words because of the difference in the wording as that portion of the instruction was actually given. The second
paragraph of said requested Instruction No. 5 had reference to the furnishing by defendant to plaintiff of a reasonably safe place to work and suggested to the jury that if
they found that the defendant failed to furnish plaintiff
a reasonably safe place to work "in that it allowed the area
where plaintiff was required to station himself" to become
and remain covered with ice, etc., then they should find for
the plaintiff. Such an instruction by including the statement "where plaintiff was required to station himself,"
assumed a matter which the jury had to decide, and such
an instruction under the facts of this case would not be
proper because by the wording there given it would have
directed the jury to find for the plaintiff if the jury found
that there was ice and snow on the switch ties where plain.
tiff stood to throw the switch regardless of whether the
jury might or might not.;have otherwise found that it was
necessary for plaintiff to stand there. In order to have
rendered such an instruction proper under the facts of this
case it would have been necessary to have in some way
included in the instruction not only the qu~stio:n of "if you
find that the ice and snow rendered the plaintiff's footing
unsafe," but also "and if you find that it was reasonably
necessary for plaintiff to stand on said ice covered ties
where the footing would be unsafe in order to throw said
switch;" and then if the slippery condition, plus the neces-
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sity of his standing there, proximately caused the accident
in whole or in part, the plaintiff would have been entitled
to some verdict, provided, that the jury otherwise found
that it was negligence on the part of the defendant to allow
ice and sno'v on the ties in the first place. The matters
contained in that second paragraph of Instruction No. 5
were given in substance elsewhere in the instructions besides, and there was no error in the court in refusing to give
all of the Instruction No. 5 as requested.
At the top of page 32 of his brief appellant refers to
proximate cause and states: "There is no such thing as
'proximate cause' ,under the Federal Employers' Liability
'\
Act." \Ve are surprised at counsel's statement and cannot
feel that they are serious in urging such a proposition. In
their argument at the top of page 32 counsel were apparently
intending to refer to matter contained in the court's Instruction No. 17 wherein the question of proximate cause is
raised rather than in Instruction No. 15 of the court's instructions immediately preceding counsel's argument at
the top of page 32. In their brief to the trial court counsel
attacked the court's Instruction No. 17, then followed with
the statement referred to above that there was no such thing
as proximate cause under the F. E. L. A.

In the case of Reynolds, Administratrix v. Atlantic fgl..EC:/'JJJ~
1'7 "
.
Coast Line Railroad Co., 336 U. S. 207 (Decided February 6 f to>. G,t;.FJ;- ·
1949), the United States Supreme Court sustained the
Supreme Court of Alabama wherein the Alabama court had
found that there was some negligence but that the negligence found was not the proximate cause of the accident
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In question. The Supreme Court of the United States in
referring to the Alabama court's decision and in affirming
that court stated :

"*

* * It held, however,. that the facts al-

leged did not show that the accident resulted proximately, in whole or in part, from that negligence.
We cannot say that the Supreme Court of Alabama
erred."
Again we say, we are surprised at counsel's statement
because it has been our understanding of the law that liabil..
ity in any negligence case does not attach regardless of
whether it is a federal liability case or any other type of
case unless such negligence as is chargeable to a defendant
is shown to be in some manner a proximate cause of an
injury sustained.
I

On page 33 of appellant's brief, after referring to only
parts of Instructions Nos. 21 and 23 as given by the court,
counsel complain of instructions as given with respect to
guess-work, conjecture or speculation, and state that "as
a matter of legal principle a permissive inference could
reasonably be deducted that the place of work was unsafe
because slick and slippery." There was no question of permissible or permissive inference in this matter at all. The
plaintiff and his witness Beckett testified directly to the
slick and slippery and unsafe condition. It was not necessary for the jury to draw any inference or to guess or
speculate in any manner whatsoever; the only question was
as to whether or not the jury would believe the statements of
these witnesses. If they believed them, no inference was
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necessary. An inference is permissible where there is no
direct testimony upon a subject, but where the plaintiff and
his star 'vitness directly state that the whole area was covered with ice and snow, that it was all slick and slippery
and unsafe, there is no question of inference in any manner
whatsoever, and the fact as to whether or not a court may
have instructed the jury that they should not guess or speculate could not apply to such ·testimony. Appellant seems to
feel that if the jury believed that the ties were slick and
slippery and unsafe, then that in and of itself would compel
a verdict for the plaintiff. Counsel overlook the fact, however, that there was very definitely in this case a question
as to whether or not it was negligence on the part of the
defendant to fail to keep all ice and snow off these switch ties
or whether or not it was necessary or proper for the plaintiff to stand on the ties while manipulating the switch, and
that was a matter the jury had to determine as well as the
question of the slick and slippery condition of these ties.
We firmly disagree with plaintiff's contention that
plaintiff's requested Instructions No. 4 and No. 5 are correct statements of the law as applied to the evidence in
this case, and we think it would have been error for the
court to give them as requested. We think that the court
committed no error in refusing them, and we feel that the
court was justified in his conclusion in ruling upon the
motion for new trial wherein he stated as follows (R. 244-2) :
"During the course of the trial I discussed with
counsel for the plaintiff the instructions that were
given in the first trial of this case and asked counsel
if the instructions as given were substantially in
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accord with their views as to the law covering the
case. In answer to this, counsel stated that the instructions were substantially correct. With the exception of some minor changes, the instructions as
given in the second trial were the same as those
given in the first, and the evidence in both trials
was substantially the same. If the case were retried,
it is my judgment that the instructions could be improved upon, but considering the instructions as a
whole, the plaintiff's theory, in my judgment, was
adequately presented and the defendant's theory was
not over emphasized."
We would like to refer specifically to some of the cases
cited by counsel, and, have already quoted some from the
case of Toone v. J. P. O'Neill Const. Co.
The case of Furkovich v. Bingham Coal and Lumber Co.,
45 Utah 89, 143 P. 121, was a case involving the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. In that case a request stating that the
defendant's responsibility was for "ordinary care" or
"reasonable care" was refused because the court said it was
not at all adapted to the particular facts and circumstances
of the case. This court on appeal indicated that had a proper
request been proposed it should have been given, but no
otherwise proper request was proposed, and this court held
it was not error to refuse the one containing merely abstract
principles. Speaking of the appellant in that case, this
court said:

"* * * It offered thirteen requests,

all of

which the court refused. We have carefully examined all of them, and each, one contains some fault.
* * * It must suffice to say that because· of the
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inherent defects contained in each request the court
'vas fully justified in refusing to give any of them."
In the case of Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57
Utah 7, 169 P. 868, the defendant had given at least three
requests covering the same subject matter in a little different way, and this court held that each of the three requests as proposed was entirely proper-none of them containing any objectionable matter-and therefore the court
should have given one or the other of them, but all were
refused. That is not true in the case at bar. Both of plaintiff's requests, No.4 and No.5, contained objectionable matter and the substance of such instructions was otherwise
substantially covered.
The case of Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al.,
75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, while stating a general rule as to
theories in a case, cannot otherwise help the appellant. In
that case the court had given an instruction referring to the
duty of a driver of a motor vehicle "at crossings and street
intersections." The accident involved in that case did not
happen at a crossing or street intersection, and this court
sustained the appellant's contention that the giving of an
instruction which contained matter outside of or in addition
to the pleadings and evidence in the case was erroneous.
After citing a number of cases the court concluded:

"* * * These cases establish the proposition
that an instruction which related to matters outside
the issues, or as to which there is no substantial evidence, is improper."
That case, therefore, could do nothing else but show conclusively that the giving of Instruction No. 4 as requested
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by plaintiff would have been error because it would have
allowed the jury to find the defe~dant negligent for failure
to use sand around the switches when the question of sand
was entirely outside of any pleadings or evidence in the
case.
The case of Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.
(2d) 772, is an example of an opposite situation where instead of inserting something not within the evidence or
pleadings the court's instructions failed to instruct the jury
with respect to an emergency created by the plaintiff in
driving on the wrong side of the road. We must -assume
from the statements in that case that some of the instructions presented by defendant were proper and could have
been given, this court stating at page 778:
"The court should have given some of the defendant's requested instructions pertaining to his
theory of the case. The defendant submitted 49 requests for instructions, some of whi~h were admittedly repetitious. * * *"
In the case of McDonald v. Union Pa~ific R. Co., 167 P.
(2d) 685, the rule with respect to presenting various theories
is set forth, and counsel quote on page 43 a portion of the
opinion, ending with the question: "But did the court fail
in this respect?" Counsel neglected to give this court's
answer upon that point, which we quote:
"Keeping in mind that we are now discussing
whether or not appellant's theory of the case was
submitted to the jury, and are not discussing how
well it was submitted, it is believed that a comparison of all the quotations, so far set out in this opinion,
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will disclose to the reader that the court follows
rather closely the alleged facts and the pleadings.

* * * The court covered these theories as

ind~

cated. but, of course, did not agree wit'h appellant in
the detail of expounding them. * * *" (Italics
ours.)
\Ve submit that the foregoing statement can be applied
very definitely to the case at bar.
At the risk of repetition, we wish to call attention to ·
the instructions as they were given by the court and invite
a comparison between those instructions and the claims
made by counsel for appellant concerning plaintiff's theory.
In the court's Instruction No. 2 the court instructed that
at the time of the accident both the _plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in the conduct of interstate commerce and
that the plaintiff was acting in the course of his employment.
The instruction further states :
"This action is brought under what is known as
the Federal Employers Liability Act which provides
in substance, as far as is material in this action, that
a railroad company while engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to an employee suffering injuries while he is employed by such company in interstate commerce in cases· where such
injury results in whole or in part from the railroad
company's negligence in the operation or maintenance of its appliances or other equipment. The statutes of the State of Utah governing employers liability and workmen's compensation are not applicable
to this case.''
In Instruction No. 6 the court instructed the jury to
disabuse their minds with respect to any law of negligence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42
that they may have gained from any other cases, this instruction being given usually at the request of. the plaintiff, but at all events being given because the usual rules
with regard to contributory negligence in other cases do not
apply in F.E.L.A. cases.
In Instruction No. 8 the court instructed the jury:
"An employer is civilly liable for the negligent
acts or omissions of an employee committed while in
his service and within the scope of his employment,
that is, in the transaction of employer's business,
and if you shall find and believe from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff sustained his injuries by reason of the negligence of a fellow employee or fellow employees, (which) contributed in
whole or in part to proximately cause the plaintiff's
injuries, then I charge you that such negligence is
imputed ,to and becomes the negligence of the employer."
In Instruction No. 9 the court tells the jury that the
plaintiff claims that the defendant was guilty of negligence
in failing to furnish the plaintiff a safe place to work in
the following particular :
"That the defendant allowed the ties on which
the switch was located to become and remain covered
with snow and ice, which caused them to be in a
slick and slippery and in an unsafe condition.
"These allegations of negligence· are denied by
the defendant. Defendant alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of his own negligence."
Instruction No. 20 reads:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
defendant railroad company to exercise reasonable
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care to provide its employees a reasonably safe place
to work. This duty does not require the absolute
elimination of all danger, but only requires the
elimination of dangers which the exercise of reasonable care would remove or guard against."
In Instruction No. 22 the court gives in a long instruction, not entirely verbatim but wholly in substance and effect, the matters contained in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 6 with respect to matters which they may consider
in determining the amount of damages to a"Yard to plaintiff if they find that he is entitled to damages.
We invite a comparison of matters contained in these
instructions with the statement given -in appellant's brief
on page 73 as already herein quoted, and from such comparison it will be seen that the plaintiff's theory was very
definitely and adequately covered by the instructions as
given. It is true that not all of the instructions followed
each other in consecutive sequence. This would be impossible, and in the giving of instructions as was done here,
the court interspersed general instructions throughout the
whole group of instructions with those which may .have
referred particularly to some specific point. For instance,
after Instruction No. 2 which set forth the basis of plaintiff's claim, Instructions 3 to 5 were general instructions ;
Instruction 6 sought to disabuse the minds of the' jury as to
any ideas they may have had on the laws of negligence; Instruction No. 7 then defined negligence ; then followed Instructions 8 and 9 which added more to the theory of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff will argue that Instructions 10 and l l
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were favorable to defendant; Instruction 12 could not be so
considered; and Instructions 13 and 14 again were general.
Thus it will be seen that it cannot be contended by plaintiff that any instructions which may have set forth any of
defendant's theories on the case were given in any more
of a consecutive manner than were those applying to defendant's phase of the case. And here we will ask, are defendant and the court to be charged with error because of the
fact that the defendant submitted more requests in an effort
to assist the court in preparing the instructions than were
submitted by plaintiff? Regardless of what conclusion may
be made upon that question, it is a fact that when the instructions are read as a whole the pla~ntiff's theory is presented as adequately and directly as is any theory on behalf
of the defendant, and plaintiff's theory is presented as adequately as was warranted by any proper requests made by
plaintiff. Considering these facts, plus the fact that Instructions No. 4 and No. 5 would not have been proper in
any respect without some changes, and considering the
further fact that the substance of Instructions 4 and 5
which was not objectionable was included by the court in
the instructions as given, we confidently state that the
jury was not in any way misled, and furthermore we are
absolutely certain that appellant's counsel were not hampered in any way but were given a free rein in presenting any
argument which might be available to them and in calling
the jury's attention to any inference which may have been
available. Appellant's Point II and statements of error as
numbered 1 and 2 should be decided adversely to appellant.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR .A.T THE SECOND TRIAL IN INSTRUCTION NO. 10 BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY
THAT "* * * the mere happening. of the accident to plaintiff is no proof of negligence on the
part of either the plaintiff or defendant or evidence
of same." (Appellant's Statement of Points 4).
The entire argument of appellant under this Point III
is unavailing and appellant cannot charge error on the part
of the court with respect thereto because plaintiff did not
except to Instruction No. 10 in any manner that would make
the argument he has asserted here proper or in any manner
by which he could charge the court ·with error as he has
done in his statement of error No. 4 and his argument
under Point III.
Mr. Dwight King, one of the counsel for plaintiff, in
taking exceptions to the court's instructions, merely said
with respect to Instruction No. 10 that plaintiff "excepts
to the court's Instruction No. 10 for the reason that said
instruction and the whole of said instruction unduly emphasizes and is repetitious of the court's Instruction No.
7, subsection (c) , which defines the meaning of the word
'negligence' and also defines 'burden of proof' and 'proponderance of the evidence,' together with 'proximate
cause'." Thus the only exception taken was general, on the
basis that it was repetitious of Instruction No. 7 giving certain general definitions.
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·Instruction No. 10 consists of. three sentences. The
particular part complained of by appellant was contained
in the first sentence. If plaintiff objected to that, he should
have objected specifically to it and pointed out such objectionable matter to the court. The matter was easily
separable and the two sentences following cannot be questioned as good law even though the last one may be somewhat repetitious-not of Instruction No. 7 as charged-but
of other matters following in later instructions.
In a rather early case this court made a definite ruling
upon the taking of such exceptions and has uniformly adhered to the rule ever since. In Farnsworth v. Union Pacific
Coal Co., 32 Utah 112, 89 P. 74, this court said:
"It is no longer an open question in this court,
as it has often been held in common with most
courts, that in taking exceptions the portion that
is excepted to must be pointed out. A mere exception to an instruction is an exception in solido to the
whole instruction, and, unless the whole instruction
is bad the exception is unavailing for the purpose
of having any particular part reviewed and passed
upon by this court. * * * It is necessary, however, in taking exceptions to bring sharply to the
mind of the trial court the particular part of the
instruction that is faulty so that it may be corrected.
* * * It is an easy rnatter to except to a phrase
or to a sentence or to any number of such phrases or
sentences and when this is done the matter can be
intelligently corrected by the trial court."
This Fa1,.nsworth case has been cited and followed in
numerous cases decided by this court since that time.
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Even \\.,here parts of an instruction may be bad, if
part of the instruction is good, a general exception will not
be available. Ra.'mpton v. Cole, 52 Utah 35, 172 P. 477:
"Conceding the instruction under consideration
to be erroneous in that regard, yet as we have pointed
out the first paragraph was proper and correctly
stated the law. The exception taken was taken to
the instruction as a whole, and therefore, for that
reason was insufficient and must be disregarded."
In McLaughlin v. Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al.,
62 Utah 532, 220 P. 726, the court said:

"The exception taken was to the instruction as
a whole.
"'It is a rule too well established to be the subject of controversy that such an exception cannot
be sustained if any part of the instruction is good.'
Hansen v. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 Pac.
852.

*

*

*

*

*

"The first part of the instruction stated in a
separate se~tence, closing with a period, is clearly
severable from the remainder, and states a correct
rule of law, * * *
"It is apparent that appellant's exception was
not properly taken, and that, although part of the
instruction be erroneous, it is not a proper subject
for review by this court.
"The purpose of an exception to an instruction
is to call the attention of the trial court to the particular part of the instruction claimed to be faulty.

* * *
"* * * 'It is an easy matter to except to a
phrase, or to a sentence, or to any number of such
phrases or sentences, and, when this is done, the
matter can be intelligently corrected by the trial
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court, and, if not corrected, may likewise be intelligently reviewed by this court. Without this no intelligent review can be made, nor is the lower court
advised just to what part of the instruction the exception refers, nor does this court, until argument
is made upon it. Moreover, it is not ,a review at all
of the lower court's act, since it was not brought
to its attention at the trial'."
This rule is seen to be specifically and directly applicable in this case because with respect to Instruction No. 19
as given by the court, when plaintiff's counsel made their
exceptions thereto, the court corrected the error, if any
therein, recalled the jury, told them to disregard Instruction
No. 19 as he had given it to them, and gave them a new
Instruction No. 19 from which had been eliminated matters
to which plaintiff's counsel had objected (R. 236-2).
In the early case of Wilson v. Sioux Consolidated Mining Co., 16 Utah 392, 52 P. 626, this court stated:
"Errors relating to the instructions of the court
were also assigned, but, in the absence of proper exceptions, we cannot consider them. 'An exception,
to be of avail in an appellate court, should, in a case
where any portion of the charge is correct, be strictly
confined to the objectionable matter, and the judge's
attention called thereto at the time of the delivery
of the charge, so that an opportunity may be afforded him to make a correction'."
In the case of Lindsay Land & Livestock Co.

v. Smart

Land & Livestock Co., 43 Utah 554, 137 P. 837, the court
said:

"* * * The reason for the rule is obvious.
When the trial court charges the jury, any defect or
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omission or misstatement of the law should be clearly pointed out to that court, so that it may be corrected before the jury has passed on the case. Where
it is contended, therefore, that only a portion of a
paragraph is faulty, the particular portion must be
pointed out in the trial court by the party excepting,
so that the court may know just what is excepted to.
If this be not done, the trial court has no means of
knowing to what point or matter or thing the exception is directed, and hence is unable to supply an
omission or to correct an incorrect statement of the
law. The rule is intended to aid the trial courts in
correcting erroneous statements of the law, and in
supplying omissions in the instructions, and if strictly enforced will tend to correct many errors that
other,vise would go undetected. *· * *"
In the case of Dimraick v. Utah Fuel Co., 49 Utah 430,
164 P. 872, the court said:
"The only exception taken at the trial by the
appellants to the foregoing instruction was to that
portion wherein the court told the jury that 'the
risks that are assumed by an employee * * *
are those that * * * appear to threaten immediate injury to such employee.' Appellants' counsel, in their brief, contend that the instruction was
erroneous and prejudicial in other particulars, but
we find no exceptions were taken in the court below
to such other portions of the instruction now complained of, and therefore this court cannot here for
the first time consider them as grounds for reversal.
* * *"
In Mehr v. Child et al., 90 Utah 348, 61 P. (2d) 624, the
court said:
"In any event, the whole instruction is not bad,
appellants having confined their objections to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

whole instruction which is divisible into integral
parts. They are not entitled to p-revail on their assignment with respect to that instruction. When an
instruction is divisible into integral parts and any
one or more of the integral parts is not open to objection, then, and in such case, an objection to the
whole must fail."
In the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in the case
of Fowler v. Medical Arts Bldg. 112 Utah 367, 188 P. (2d)
711, the rule was recognized and stated as follows:
"* * * It is well settled in this jurisdiction
that where an exception is taken to the whole of an
instruction, the exception will not be sustained
unless the whole instruction is bad. If the instruction is partially correct and partially erroneous, the
erroneous part of the instruction must be pointed out
by the party taking exception thereto. Since the exception was to the whole of the instruction and only a
part, if any, of the instruction was erroneous, it follows that the assignment of error cannot be sustaine d . * * *"

See also:

Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P .. (2d)
654.

Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, 3d Ed.,
Vol. 1, Sec. 174, p. 464.

Ryan v. Beaver County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. (2d)
858.
Respondent does not waive its right to insist that such
error cannot be charged because of failure on the part of
plaintiff to properly except thereto, but without waiving
such right and in spite of continuing our insistence that the
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matter 'vas not properly preserved for argument before this
court by proper exceptions, respondent nevertheless insists
that Instruction No. 10, including that particular part now
attacked by appellant, was proper.
Appellant on page 45 of his brief quotes from 38 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 290, p. 985. Counsel fail to quote the
general statement given at the beginning of that Sec. 290,
p. 983, wherein it is stated:

"* * * Negligence, however, is a fault, and
is not to be presumed, but rather must be proved.
Apart from tke rule of res ipsa loquitur, negligence
cannot be assumed from the mere fact of an accident
and an injury. The mere fact that an accident happens is not evidence of negligence. (Italics ours.)

* * *"
The cases cited in the footnote statements quoted by
counsel on page 45 are res ipsa loquitur cases, or rather the
Michigan case is a res ipsa loquitur case and the Massachusetts case is one involving a defective coupler, which
is similar to a res ipsa loquitur case, and now in effect made
such by the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Likewise some
of the cases cited by counsel, if not the majority of cases
supporting any such position for which they contend, are res
ipsa loquitor cases or cases with peculiar facts similar to
res ipsa loquitur cases.
In res ipsa loquitur cases, the mere fact of the accident
does not raise an inference of negligence, but where in
addition to the fact of the happening of the accident it is
shown that the instrumentality causing the injury is under
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the exclusive control of the defendant charged with negligence, and where it also appears that the very nature of
the accident is such that it does not ordinarily happen unless the person in charge of such instrumentality is negligent,
then, and only when such circumstances appear, negligence
can be inferred. That is not true in the case at bar. Counsel
misconstrue the fact of the accident or injury with the
circumstances surrounding the injury and how the accident
and injury happened. That is something more than and in
addition to the mere fact of accident. Such a view includes
all surrounding circumstances which go to show why the
accident happened. Such matters are evidentiary matters
and are proper in an attempt to prove negligence. However, the mere fact that Williams fell and broke his leg
does not say that he, the railroad, or anyone else was negligent.
Counsel on page 47 of their brief state that "The slipping and falling on the switch ties * * *" was proper
proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant in failing to
furnish a safe place to work. "The slipping and falling on
· the switch ties." is something more and in addition to the
mere fact of the accident. Those are evidentiary facts surrounding the accident, showing how and why it happened,
not merely that it happened. Counsel add: "yet this event
and occurrence was removed from jury consideration." Such
a statement is absurd and counsel know better and know
that not only was it not removed from the jury's consideration, but counsel developed fully the circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident and developed in
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detail how the accident occurred according to plaintiff's
theory. The happening of an accident is one thing; the facts
surrounding it, giving evidence as to how and why it happened, are another ; and counsel should distinguish between
the two.
In the case of Le~vis v. Davis, 59 Utah 85, 201 P. 861,
the nature of the accident itself was something tending to
show negligence. In fact, the court concluded that the explosion would not have occurred had the carbide gas generator been properly handled. The Le~vis case is really a res
ipsa loquitur case. There was no eyewitness to the accident
and Lewis was dead. He was dead as a result of an explosion,
and the court concluded the explosion would not have happened if the railroad company, which had charge of the
carbide gas generator, had maintained it properly. It was
the type of an accident- which would not have occurred except for negligence on the part of someone having control
of it.
Counsel cite and quote at length from the case of Orris
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry Co., 214 S. W. 125. It is interesting
to note with respect to this case that the publishers in setting
out the syllabus give as Syllabus 2 : "The mere fact of injury standing alone is no proof of negligence," and the
court admits in that case that such had been the holding
theretofore. The court then says that the cases do not say
that the character of the injury inflicted may not be a circumstance tending to show negligence, or a fact from which,
when coupled with other facts, negligence may not be inferred. One of the judges in a dissenting opinion in the
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Orr.is case accuses the court of having departed from the
rule theretofore followed in Missouri, and states:

"* * * Injury and suit of themselves, or per
se, do not warrant an inference of negligence in cases
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application. Such has been the uniform ruling of this
court. Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. loc. cit. 74, 18 S. W.
1149. In such cases the plaintiff must do three things
in order to discharge the burden of proving the negligence charged : First, show an injury; second, negligence on the part of the defendant; and, third, a causal connecti_on between the negligence and the injury.
In taking these steps· no inference of negligence
arises from proof of the naked fact' of injury, and if
the plaintiff stops there no recovery can be had.
But the plaintiff must go further and establish negligence · from other facts and circumstances. Having
done that, and having also shown the efficiency of
the negligence in causing the injury, a case is then
(and not until then) made for the jury, * * *"
We would like to point out to the court and counsel
that the Orris case is not considered law in the State of
Missouri now.
In the case of Nicholson v. Franciscus et al., 40 S. W.
(2d) 623, an instruction had been given as follows:
"The court instructs the jury that the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover in this case merely because
she may have been injured while working for the
defendants."
After a jury verdict for defendants, plaintiff appealed
charging error and citing the Orris case. The Supreme
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Court of Missouri refused to follow the Orris case and
sustained the trial court's judgment, saying:

"*

*

* Ordinarily, it is not error to tell

the jury that the mere fact that plaintiff was injured does not necessarily create liability or warrant an inference of defendant's negligence. The
rulings in the Orris Case and the cases following it
are based upon a distinction between cases wherein
the character of the injury is of itself a material
link in the chain of circumstance·s tending to show
negligence, and cases where the injury is not of
such a character. Sharp v. City of ~c:arthage, 319
Mo. 1028, 5 S. W. (2d) 6. The rule laid down in
the Orris Case is followed and applied' by the
courts only in that class of cases wherein the
peculiar characteristics of the injury itself may be
a link in the chain of circumstances tending to
prove the negligence alleged in the petition. Manthey v. Kellerman ·Contracting Co., 311 Mo. 147,
277 S. W. 927; Sharp v. City of Carthage, supra;
Schmeer v. Anchor Cold Storage Co. (Mo. Sup.)
12 S. \V. (2d) 433, 436; Moss v. Wells (Mo. Sup.)
249 S. W. 411. In the instant case, there is nothing
in the character of the injury sustained by plaintiff tending to show negligence on the part of defendants. * * *"
With this and other cases, the Missouri court has limited
the rule as announced in the Orris case to the peculiar facts
of the case. At first, it seemed to limit the ruling of the case
to res ipsa loquitur cases, but later the Missouri court approved such an instruction even in res ipsa loquitur cases.
In the case of Palmer v. Hygrade Water & Soda Co.,
(Mo.) 151 S. W. (2d) 548, the trial court had granted a
new trial after a verdict for the defendant upon the basis
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that it thought it had erred in giving an instruction numbered as Instruction No. 9, but the Missouri Appellate Court
reversed the trial court and reinstated the original judgment
and approved the giving of an instruction that the happening of an accident is no evidence of negligence. We quote
the following from that opinion:
"The gist of the criticized instruction,· when
stripped of explanatory words, was to the effect
that the mere fact that plaintiff was injured and
has brought suit is no evidence of defendant's negligence or liability unless plaintiff has established
the negligence of defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence as described in the other instructions.

* * *

"There are cases where the nature and character
of the wound inflicted, the injury, has a material
bearing on the question of negligence, and such was
the case of Orris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Railway Co.,
·, 279 lVfo. 1, 214 S. W. 124, * * * And for that
reason an instruction in the Orris case, practically
the same as defendant's instruction No. 9 in this
case, was held to be erroneous; however, such ruling
was limited to the facts in that case, and the Supreme
Court in the later case of Nicholson v. Franciscus,
328 Mo. 96, 40 S. W. 2d 623, 625, in approving a
similar instruction, distinguished the Orris case
from that case in these words: 'The rule laid down
in the Orris case is followed and applied by the
courts only in that class of cases wherein the peculiar
characteristics of the injury itself may be a link in
the chain of circumstances tending to prove the
negligence alleged in the petition."
The Missouri court went on to state in the Palmer case:
"In the case of Barraclough v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 331 Mo. 157, 52 S. W. 2d 998, an instruction,
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almost identical with defendant's instruction No. 9
in this case, was approved. Similar instructions were
approved in Hicks v. Vieths, Mo. Sup., 46 S. W. 2d
604, and Gardner v. Turk, 343 Mo. 899, 123 S. W.
2d 158. These cited cases were not brought on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur; however, the fact that
this case is brought under that doctrine could not
deprive the defendant of its right to this instruction.
The rule as to such instruction is the same in a res
ipsa case as an ordinary negligence case.
"In the case of Sakowski v. Baird, 334 Mo. 951,
69 S. W. 2d 649, which is referred to as a typical res
ipsa case, the trial court set aside a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that it had committed error in giving an instruction as follows: 'The Court
instructs the jury that although you believe and find
from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case was
injured, this fact alone, regardless of how serious
such injuries to her person may be, will not warrant
you in finding in favor of the plaintiff for any sum
unless you further find and believe from the evidence that the defendant was negligent and that
such negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of
such injury, if any.'
''The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the cause with directions to set aside the order granting a new trial, reinstate the verdict, overrule the
motion for a new trial, and enter judgment on the
verdict. And in the course of the opinion the Supreme Court, with reference to this instruction,
said: 'It merely states an essential requirement to
recovery in every case founded upon negligence
whether it be a res ipsa or ordinary negligence case'."
In the case of Boyd v~ San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co.,
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 282, this court had a problem before
it similar to the one before it now. In that case a proper
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exception had not been taken. We quote the following from
the opinion :
"An exception was taken to that portion italicized. The alleged error here pointed out and argued
is not that, but to the first part of the paragraph,
where the court stated that:
"'The mere fact that an accident has happened
is not sufficient proof to charge the defendant with
negligence or the plaintiff (deceased) with contributory negligence.'
"What is urged against it is that by the use of
the word 'sufficient' the thought is implied that the
happening of the accident was some evidence to
show negligence on the part of the defendant. It is
enough to say that that portion was not excepted to
nor the court's attention directed to it by the exception. Then there is no substance to the argument. The
fair meani:ng of the charge is that negligence of
neither party is to be inferred from the mere happening of the accident. The argument, however,
makes the charge as strong against the plaintiff as
the defendant. The defendant cannot maintain that
by the charge .the jury understood that the happening of the accident was some ev~dence to show the
defendant's. negligence but not to show contributory
negligence. The court said it was not sufficient to
show either. That certainly does not imply that it
is some evidence to show the defendant's negligence
but not contributory negligence."
In Major v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 21 Utah 141, 59
P. 522, this court held:

"* * * And the mere proof that an injury
was received on a train or vehicle is not sufficient
to raise the presumption of negligence. It must be
further shown that there was some defect in appliances, or in the manner of their use. * * *"
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In Wells v. Utah Constr·uctio·n Co., 27 Utah 524, 76 P. \
560, the defendant requested an instruction containing the
following: ··You are further charged that the mere fact
that the accident has happened is not sufficient proof to
charge the defendant with negligence." The instruction also
contained matter on burden of proof and weight of evidence. For refusing such instruction this court reversed
the trial court, saying :
'"*

*

* The instruction requested by the de-

fendant was correct in all of its parts, and the trial
court therefore erred in omitting any part of the
same in the instructions given to the jury."

In the case of Moser v. Zion's Coop. Mere. Institution,
Utah . __ , 197 P. 2d 136, this court in affirming the ..
trial court, held the following instruction not to be error :
I

"You are instructed that the mere fact that an
accident happened, or that plaintiff was injured,
constitutes no proof of negligence against the defendants."
Cases from other jurisdictions approving such an
instruction are numerous. Without quoting further we will
merely refer to the following:

McKinney v. Public Service Interstate Transp.
Co., (N. J.) 72 A. (2d) 326.
Briscoe v. Pacific Elec·tric Railway Co., (Cal.)
200 P. (2d) 875.
Snyder v. MeDowell, (Kan.) 203 P. (2d) 2.25.
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Wickliffe,
(Okla.) 202 P. (2d) 423.
Lakey v. McAlester Coal Co., (Okla.) 224 P.
309.
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Stanalo.nis v. Branch Motor Express Co., (Pa.)
57 A. (2d) 866.
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Pere Marquette
R. Co., (Mich.) 34 N. W. (2d) 46.
Vaughn v. Huff, (Va.) 41 S. E. (2d) 482.
Miller v. Cranston, (Cal.) 106 P. (2d) 9·63.
Amarillo Coc·a-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder,
(Texas) 207 S. W. (2d) 632.

Pacific Coast R. Co. v. American Mail Line
'
(Wash.) 172 P. (2d) 226.
Goff v. City Lines of W .. Va., 43 S. E. (2d) 800.
Tamagno v. Conley, (Mass.) 76 N. E. (2d) 637.
Swans·on v. Progress Electric Co., 3·9 Ill. App.
188, 67 N. E. (2d) 426.
Halliday v. Raymond, (Neb.) 22 N. W. (2d)
614.

Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., (Kan.) 185 P.
(2d) 158.
Respondent respectfully submits not only was it not
error for the court to instruct the jury as he did in Instruction No. 10, but the failure of plaintiff to except to said

in~

struction, and specifically the failure to except to that portion now attacked by appellant, precludes a·ppellant from
urging error on that basis in this court.
"

P'OINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT, AT' T:HE SEIC·O·ND TRIAL,
DID NOT' ERR BY GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO.
12, N'OR DID THE C·OURT· BY SUCH INSTRUCTION REVIVE THE DOCT.RINE OF CONTRIBUT'ORY NE·G,LIGENCE AS A COMPL.E:TE BAR
T'O RECOVERY. (Statement of Points 6.)
In Instruction No. 12 the court attempted to point out
to the jury which of the respective parties had the burden
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of proof with repect to the issues of neglig·ence on the part
of defenqant or contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, and by objecting as appellant has done to the
instruction in question, we must again charge appellant
with quibbling over mere 'vords. Counsel for appellant
assume the position in their argument under Point No. IV
that the 'vord "defense" can mean nothing in any instance
except a .complete bar. There is nothing to indicate that
the jury would so consider it, nor is there even anything
in the record nor in appellant's argument to indicate that
an average attorney or court dealing with technical language day-by-day "\Vould so assume that the use of the
word defense would mean a complete bar. Appellant gives
Webster's Dictionary definition of defense as, "An opposing or denial of the truth or validity of the plaintiff's case,"
and then adds: "Contributory negligence is only material
as bearing on the issue o_f damages." We think it could as_
consistently be said that in as much as contributory negligence is material in an F.E.L.A. case as bearing on the
issue of damages, it is therefore a defense pro tanto. It is~
interesting to note that Section 53 of U.S.C.A. as quoted
by counsel does not say that contributory negligence shall
not be a defense, but says that "contributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee * * *" Must we assume
without anything more than this record shows that a jury
of laymen would conclude by the use of the words "defense
of contributory negligence," as us-ed by the court, that the
court intended to indicate that such would be a complete
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bar? The mere stating of such a question shows that the
obvious answer would be a. denial. The court specifically
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 6 that if they had
ever had any experinece in any other negligence case that
they "should wholly disregard any and all conceptions which
you may have had with respect to the law of negligence" as
gained by such prior experience, and the court told them:
"You are to be guided solely and wholly by these instructions, and you must wholly disregard your own conception
of what the law is or ought to be in this case."
If we are to indulge in any assumption upon the matter, we should assume as was stated by this court in Ryan
v. Beaver County, 82 Utah .27, 21 P. (2d) 858:
"The jury is bound on questions of law to yield
full obedience to instructions of the court, and this
applies as well to that part of the charge defining
the issues, as made by the pleadings, as to the law as
declared by the court and made applicable to the
evidence as submitted."
Counsel go on under their Point IV to cite cases to the
effect that conflicting instructions should not be given.
We admit to be good la.w the rule that it is error to give
conflicting instructions where such instructions, when considered together with other instructions, cannot be reconciled. But that is not the question here. In order to show
the extent to which counsel for appellant have gone to quibble over words, we would like to ca11 attention to other instructions given by the court. Following Instruction No.
12, the court gave Instructions No. 13 and No. 14, in which
he tried to explain the meaning of the term negligence,
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which broadens to some extent the definitions given of negligence and ordinary care in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Instruction No. 7. In none of these was the jury told what
their duty would be if they found the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent, nor were they in any respect advised
as to their responsibilities if they determined that the "defense" of contributory negligence had been established. In
Instruction No. 21, however, the court did tell the jury that
if they found that the plaintiff failed to exercise that degree of care that an ordinary reasonably prudent person
'vould have done, and if they found "that such failure on
the part of the plaintiff proximately contributed to cause
plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover full damages,~ but only a diminished sum bearing
the same relation to the full damages that the negligence
attributable to the defendant bears to the negligence attributable to both parties, the purpose being to exclude
from the recovery a proportional part of the damages corresponding to the plaintiff's contribution to the total negligence."
\

The plaintiff took no exception whatsoever to the
court's manner of thus telling the jury in Instruction No.
21 what they should do if they found that contributory negligence had been established. Instruction No. 21 is~ not conflicting nor contradictory of Instruction No. 12, but merely
explains No. 12 and tells the jury what they should do 'if
they find contributo.ry negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Instruction 21 would have been sufficient to obviate
any question with respect to Instruction No. 12 had nothing
further been said with respect thereto, but the court did
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not leave it at that. In Instruction No. 23 the court went
on to state: "If you should find that it is just as probable
that plaintiff was free from negligence, or even if negligent,
that his negligence did not contribute as a proximate cause
of the injury, as it is that negligence on the plaintiff's part
did contribute as a proximate cause, then the defense of
contributory negligence has not been established." The
same wording of "defense of contributory negligence" is
thus used in Instruction N·o. 23, but counsel for appellant
artfully evade quoting that portion of Instruction No. 23
where they quote Instructions 21 and 23 on page 32· of their
brief. The last paragraph of Instruction 23 following immediately the wording just giveri, "then the defense of
contributory negligence has not been established," reads,
"You are further instructed in this case that if you find
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, you can only
consider that in mitigating the damages, or, in other words,
if the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, you are
to determine the portion of the amount of damages he has
sustained that he is to bear himself."
We repeat that there is nothing in the record to indicate that ordinary laymen sitting on a jury would assume
that the use of the words "defense of contributory negligence" as used by the court would mean to such laymen
that they should consider such contributory negligence as
a complete bar.
The decided cases· are not by any means all in accord
with counsel's attitude in this case that the word defense
must mean a complete bar.
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In Aetna Life Insura.nce Co. v. Brockman, 70 F. (2d)
647, the Federal Circuit c·ourt of Appeals, in a case arising
in Colorado, quoted and followed the case of Whitfield v.
Aetna Life Insurance Co., 205 U. S. 489·, wherein it was
said:

"* * * Whatever tends to diminish the
plaintiff's cause of action or to ·defeat recovery in
whole or in part amounts in law to a defense * * *"
(Italics ours.)
In lFaterford Lumber Co. v. Jacobs, (Miss.) 97 S. 187,
the court said:
"A defense to a cause of action is any fact or
state of facts which will defeat it in whole or in
part, or, in other words, any matter which tends
to diminish the amount of recovery or to entirely
defeat the cause of action."
In Scott v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District,
(N. D.) 107 N. W. 61, the court said:
"A defense is any fact or state of facts which
will defeat in whole or in part a cause of action. 2
Words & Phrases, p. 1939."
We think that the case of McM'aster v. Salt Lake
Transp. Co., 108 Utah 207, 159 P. (2d) 121, decided by this
court, is a complete answer to appellant's argument under
Point IV. That case involved injury to a passenger riding
in a taxicab operated by a ~ompany considered to be a common carrier. Admittedly the duty owed by the taxicab company to the passenger was a duty to exercise the highest
degree of care. It was contended on appeal that the trial
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court erred because in one of the instructions it gave a
definition of "ordinary care," and it was argued that thereby the jury was allowed to believe that "ordina;ry care" was
all that was required of the defendant. In affirming the
trial court this court stated :

"* * * The duty imposed upon the defendant by law was to use the utmost care to transport
the plaintiff safely. * * * Therefore, an instruction defining 'ordinary care' could have been
of no possible aid to the jury. * * * Yet in view
of the other instructions given, we do not think that
the jury could have been misled in this regard.
"The jury was told in instruction number 8 that
the law imposes on the defendant taxicab company
the duty to exercise the highest degree of care. Instruction number 10 told the jury that: 'While such
relationship (of public taxicab carrier and passenger) exists, the law imposes the duty upon a taxicab
carrier of exercising the highest degree of care to
protect its passengers against accidents'."
The court then concluded:
"In view of the instructions telling the jury that
the defendant owed the highest degree of care to
transport the plaintiff safely * * * it is not
likely that the jury was at all misled or confused
by the giving of a definition of ordinary care.
* * *"
The court concluded its opinion stating:

"* * * The granting or denying of a motion
for a new trial rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court. There is nothing in the record on appeal
to indicate that this discretion was abused in this
case.''
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The use of the \vords "defense of contributory negligence" as complained of by appellant herein would not be
as serious as a definition of ordinary care in a case where
something in addition to ordinary care was required because we cannot assume that a j'ury would have in mind
counsel's opinion that the word defense meant a complete
'bar, particularly in view of the fact that the court, in the
other instructions referred to, specifically told· the jury
what they should do '"if the defense of contributory negligence" was established and if they so found, that it should
only be considered in mitigation or by way of diminishing
damages that plaintiff might otherwise be entitled to.
We respectfully submit that the court did not err in
giving Instruction No. 12.

POINT V
THE TRIAL ·COURT AT THE SECOND TRIAL
DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO.
19, NOR DID HE T~HEREBY REVIVE T HE DOCTRINES OF CONTRIBUT·ORY NEGLIGENCE
AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. (Statement of
Point 7.)
1

Without repeating the cas·es which we have heretofore
cited in this brief in connection with our argument under
appellant's Point III, we wish to point out to the court
that any claimed error resulting from the giving of Instruction No. 19 is not properly before this court for review because the plaintiff and appellant failed to take any exception whatsoever to said Instruction No. 19 as given. We
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respectfully refer the court to the cases heretofore cited
in connection with our argument under appellant's Point
III and to the law as therein set forth.
When the court upon the second trial in this case concluded his instructions to the jury and before argument to
the jury he asked counsel for both parties if they had observed any error of an elemental nature that they wanted
to call to the court's attention and both counsel said they
had none ( R. 229-2) .
After the argument to the jury and after_ the jury had
retired to deliberate, formal exceptions were then taken
and· among others the defendant did take an exception to
the court's instruction No. 19 as given. The exception as
taken was mainly of a general nature but plaintiff's counsel
added "and plaintiff excepts particularly to the words 'and
any voluntary departure from the path of safety will prevent his recovery for his injury.'" (R. 232-2). The instruction as the court had theretofore given it was verbatim with
the instruction as given on the first trial o:f the case and
upon the plaintiff thus taking exception the court had some
discussion with counsel and the court concluded that it
would be necessary for him to change and reframe the
instruction. The court thereupon recalled the jury and
re-instructed them in connection therewith as follows:
"Gentlemen of the jury, since you retired from the courtroom the court has concluded to withdraw from your consideration what he read as Instruction No. 19 and to substitute what I am about to read as Instruction No. 19·" (R.
236--2). The court then gave Instruction No. 19 as is set
forth on page 62 of appellant's brief, which instruction had
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been reframed and from which was entirely . deleted the
words "any voluntary departure from the path of safety
will prevent his recovery for his injury," as theretofore excepted to by plaintiff's counsel. The substituted Instruction No. 19 as thus given by the court was agreed. to by.
plaintiff's counsel and after the g·iving of such substituted
instruction PLAINTIFF. MADE NO OBJECTION OR EXCEPTION THERETO WHATSOEVER, in spite of the fact
that counsel for defendant did except because by the changing of such instruction the court had not given defendant's
Instruction No. 10 as requested. T'he change thus made
by the court was made at the request of counsel for plaintiff, was agreed to by counsel for plaintiff, and after the
giving of the substituted instruction no objection or exception was taken by plaintiff and plaintiff cannot be heard
to complain in this court that the trial court committed error
in the giving of such instruction.
WE DO NOT WIS.H TO WAIVE OUR RIGHT ·TO
INSIST THAT PLAINTIFF'S F AlLURE TO EX·CEPT
TO SUCH INSTRUCTION PRECLUDES HIM FR·OM
CHARGING ERROR. HEREIN, BUT ASIDE FROM T'HAT
FACT WE STRENUOUSLY INSIST THAT THE C·OURT
DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN THE GIVING OF SAID
INSTRU·CT'ION NO. 19.
Appellant starts from a false premise and argues
throughout on this point, not upon the question as to
whether the plaintiff had a safe and an unsafe place or ·
way in which he could do his work with a safe place amply
available to him, but appellant argues upon the premise
that plaintiff had been assigned to work in an unsafe place
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and then argues that by the court instructing· the jury on
contributory negligence the court had revived the doctrine
of assumption of risk. Appellant states on page 62 of his
brief that. "plaintiff owed no duty to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care to discover and use a safe way of throwing the switch, even assuming that there was a safe and
a dangerous way available to him. HE SIMPLY OWED
THE DUTY OF CONDU·CTJNG HIMSEL1F A.S A REASONABLY PRUDENT PERS.ON UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANiCES." Thus appellant admits that plaintiff did owe
the duty of conducting himself as a reasonably prudent
person under the circumstances and IN INSTRUCT'ION
NO. 19· T'HE COURT TOLD THE JURY NOTHIN'G MORE
T'HAN THAT PL.AINT'IF'F SHOUL.D ACT AS A REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON WOULD HAVE DONE
UNDER THE CIRCUMST.AN·CES. Appellant further states
at the top of page 63, of his brief, "If he negligently chose
a dangerous way when a safe way were available to him,
that could amount to nothing more than contributory negligence on his part * * *." There was no attempt on the
part of either court or counsel to say that the failure to
· use a safe way rather than a dangerous way was other
than negligence. However, that negligence may have been
either contributory negligence or the jury may have found
that such negligence was the sole negligence in the case.
The facts· of this case did not compel a finding of n~gli
gence on the part of the defendant but it was left for the
jury to decide whether, under the circumstances, either
plaintiff or defendant or both were negligent, and the court
was required to instruct the jury, upon proper request being
\
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made, that they should determine just who was negligent
~~: and what negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
~ .. to plaintiff, 'vhether the negligence proximately causing
~W• plaintiff's injury vvas entirely his "without negligence on
.. ~·~ the part of the defendant" as set forth in Instruction No.
17, (against vvhich plaintiff also complains without except...... '
~~~ ing thereto), or 'vhether the negligence was that of defen~~~. dant, or both.
I: I'

...

···

"""
--.··

;; l

~~c

.. .
~~~

···

··

...

We think in their argument under Point V counsel for
appellant again unjustly accuse the court and twist the
language of the instructions in an attempt to do so. On ·
page 65 of their brief counsel say: "It will be noted that
the court places the burden on plaintiff of discovering at
his peril, the safer or less dangerous of two available ways
of performing a duty." Again we are amazed at counsel's
interpretation or understanding of the English language.
Wherein could it be said that the court holds the plaintiff
to the responsibility of "discovering at his peril." The instruction says, "The employe owes a duty to ex~rcise reasonable and ordinary care to discover and use the safe
way." That does not mean "discovering at his peril", but
merely means that the plaintiff should act as an ordinary,
reasonable man. Later on in the instruction the court directs the jury to find whether "the plaintiff by the exercise
orf reasonable and ordinary care would have dis·co:vered
such safe way." This again is not charging him to discover
it at his peril but only to· act as a reasonable ·man. Again
the instruction says, "but nevertheless chose a position. on
the ties which he as a reasonable and prudent switchman
should have known were slippery and dangerous." The
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court does .not say that the plaintiff should act at his peril
but says· that he is held to the responsibility of acting as a
reasonable man would have acted and the court repeats
that measuring stick "as a reasonable and prudent man"
three times in the instruction and only states. that the plaintiff would be guilty of negligence if he did not act as an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man. That does not say
that he must be held to the responsibility of "discovering
at his peril", but merely states that the plaintiff has the
responsibility of acting as· an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent man would have acted under the circumstances.

AND THAT IS THE LAW, REGAR;DLESS OF HOW
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL MAY SEEK T'O TWIST· THE
MEANING OF T'HE PLAIN WORDS USED BY THE
COURT IN T'HE INS.TRUCTIO·N.
Even in the case of Brady v. Florence & C. C. R. Co.,
(Colo.) 98 P. 321, quoted by counsel on page 64 of their
brief, the court gives the measuring stick as that of a reasonable man and says t:ha t a person is not negligent if he
acts as a reasonable man would have acted under the circumstances, and at the same time inferentially states that
if the method ·chosen would not have been adopted under
like circumstances by a reasonable and prudent 1nan, then
Brady would have been negligent. In the case at bar the
court did not say that Williams would be guilty of negligence if he failed to use a safer way, but the court did say
that he was held to act as a reasonable man would have
acted and that the jury could find that he was negligent if the
jury should find that as a reasonable man he should have
determined there was a safer way and if as a reasonable
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man he should have used the safer way. Such an instruction was no more favorable to defendant than to plaintiff.
It merely held plaintiff to the same rule to which other
instructions held the defendant, and that is, that he· should
have acted as a reasonable man would have acted under the
circumstances.
Appellant refers to the fact that plaintiff said he did
not know the switch ties were slick and slippery until he
slipped and fell. Still appellant insists that respondent
must be charged with the knowledge of the slickness of the
surrounding area and plaintiff was in a better position to
know than anyone else, because prior to his accident he
had already covered the entire area of the three switches
and manipulated each of the three.
At the bottom of page 65 and. top of page 66 of his
brief appellant states: '"If the place of work was unsafe
the defendant must under the law be charged with violation
of its duty toward ·plaintiff." By "place of work" ,plaintiff's
counsel can mean nothing other than the place where pl~in
tiff did the work and if that is their meaning the statement
is not correct because the defendant need not .be charged
with violation of its duty toward plaintiff if the place where
he did his work was unsafe, if there was a safe place and
a safer way to do the work and such safe place and safer
way would have been discovered and used by a reasonable
man under the circumstances, as referred to in Instruction
No. 19.
We call attention to the fact that not only the defendant, but plaintiff requested an instruction which told the
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jury that the defendant must exercise reasonable care to
provide its employes· a reasonably safe place to work, and
that this duty does not require the absolute elimination of
all d'anger, but only requires the elimination of danger which
the exercise of reasonable care would remove or guard
against. The defendant is not an insurer of its employes ·
and the cases are legion holding that an employer is entitled to assume that its. employes· will exercise reasonable
care or that care which an ordinary, reasonably prudent
employe would exercise.
Plaintiff's counsel attempt to drag a "red herring"
across the trail by arguing the doctrine of assumption of
risk. There is no question of assumption of risk involved
herein and I am surprised at the efforts of appellant's
counsel to cloud the issues in. that way. It is similar to their
attempt to convince the court that "proximate cause" is not
to be considered in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases.
Regardless of whether counsel may call it assumption of
risk, or whatever it is, an employe as well as an employer
is still bound by law to act as an ordinary, reasonable,
prudent man, and' heaven help us if the time ever comes
when it can be· said that employers must act as reasonable
men but employes need not do so. Requiring an employe
to act as a reasonable man cannot in any way be considered as p]acing on him the burden of "assumption of risk."
On page 66 of appellant's brief counsel state that the
instruction was the same as saying to the jury, "If plaintiff
should have discovered the unsafe place of work, but did
not, and was injured thereby, he assumes the risks assoc-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75

iated 'vith the unsafe condition." Counsel are again playing "~ith 'vords. Instruction No. 19 told the jury, in effect,
that if plaintiff should, as a reasonable man, have discovered that one "'ay of doing the work was unsafe, but a safe
wav was available, and if a reasonable man would have
discovered and used the safer way, then the jury could find
plaintiff negligent for not acting as a reasonable man would
have done in discovering and using the safe way. That is
the most that could be stated with respect to the instruc- .
tion and that is the law, and in two other instructions as
given by the court the court repeated that negligence on
plaintiff's part could only be considered in mitigating of
damages and that his right to damages otherwise, if the
jury so found, could only be diminished proportionately,
unless, as the court said in Instruction No. 17, plaintiff's
injuries were "due to his own negligence without negligence
on the part of the defendant proximately contributing"
thereto.
Not only are appellant's counsel wrong in their logic
and in their interpretation of the English language, but the
cases cited by them do not support the propositions asserted
by them. The case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co.,
318 U. S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 Sup. Ct. 444, as cited and
quoted at length by appellant's. counsel applies. in cases
where only one type of place of work is pro:vided ·by an
employer and that one place of work has certain dangers
inherent in it and no safer place or safer way of doing the
work is available or provided which a reasonable employe
would know that he should use. The Tiller case had no
question whatsoever involved in it with respect to a choice
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of places of work or manner of performing the work being
available to the employe. The case of. Boston & M. R. R. Co.
v. Cabana, 148 F. (2d) 150, cited and quoted on page 63 of
, appellant's brief is a case similar to the case of Wilkerson ··J
v. Mc~Carthy, which will be referred to later. The basis of
the appeal in the Cabana case was the claim of defendant
that the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor
of defendant. The Federal Circuit Court, however, stated
that the negligence of plaintiff, or contributory negligence,
was a question for the jury to decide and that a directed
verdict would have been improper.
On page 64 appellant cites and quotes from the case
of Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53., 69 Sup. Ct. 413.
Counsel should get no comfort from that case because that
case again involves solely the question as to whether the
court should have directed a verdict or whether it should
have been left to the jury to decide whether the railroad
was guilty of negligence and whether Wilkerson himself was
guilty of contributory negligence. In the Wilkerson case
there were two ways open to the employe and it was contended that he should have chosen the safer, in spite of the
fact that the evidence showed that numerous other employes
took the same path that he did across the slippery board.
The Supreme Cqurt of the United States in reversing the
case said : (quoting from the syllabus.)
''In this action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act there was evidence (detailed in the
opinion) which would support a jury finding of
negligence on the part of the defendants and it was
error for the trial court to direct a verdict against
the plaintiff."
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Upon the question of negligence generally, the Supreme
Court said:
''l\1uch of respondents' argument here is devoted
to the proposition that the Federal Act does not
make the railroad an absolute insurer against personal injury damages suffered by its employees.
That proposition is correct, since the Act imposes
liability only for negligent injuries. Cf. 'Coray v.
Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520. But the issue of
negligence is one for juries to determine according
to their finding of whether an employer's conduct
measures up to what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the same circumstances.
And a jury should hold a master 'liable for injuries
attributable to conditions under his control when
they are not such as a reasonable man ought to maintain in the circumstances,' bearing in mind that 'the
standard of care must be commensurate. to the dangers of the business'."
With respect to the contributory negligence of the employe
the United States Supreme Court- s~ted the language as
quoted on pages 64 and· 65 of appellant's- brief and we wish
to call particular attention to the part therein that states:
"* * * while petitioner's failure to use a safer method of crossing might be found by the jury to be contributory
negligence, the Act provides_ * * *." Thus the Supreme
Court in the Wilkers'on case holds that while the jury may,
where there is evidence, as there was in that case, find
negligence on the part of the railroad com-p-any, at the
same time "PETITIONER'S F AlL-URE T!Q USE A SAFER
METHOD OF 'CROSS:ING MIGHT BE FOUND BY THE
JURY TO BE C·ONTRIBUTORY.NE-GLIGENCE."
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In the case at bar in Instruction No. 19 the trial court
instructed the jury that the employe had the responsibility
to act as a reasonable, prudent man and that if a reasonable,
prudent man 'would have discovered and used a safer way,
then the jury could find the plaintiff guilty of negligence
if they found that he did not act as a reasonable, prudent
man would have done in using the safer way. The Wilkerson
case is authority to sustain the trial court in the giving of
Instruction No. 19-. In the case at bar the question of negligence on the part of both plaintiff and defendant was submitted to the jury and counsel cannot complain of the manner in which it was submitted. The law sustains the· instructions as given, and by failing to take proper exceptions
thereto appellant is precluded by law from- urging error
herein.
At two or three points in his argument appellant complains because the court included in the instructions a basis
upon which the jury could find that the negligence of the
plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. We
submit that such instructions were correct, but plaintiff did

not in amy instance except to such portion of any of tke
instructions and he is now out of order in complaining of
the quest~on of proximate cause as so submitted' by the court.
With respect to counsel's argument on the question of
assumption of risk we would like to refer the court to the
case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Skinner's Admx., (Ky.) 197
S. W. 552. That case involved a suit for the death of an
employe under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
case was decided at a time when assumption of risk was still
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a complete defense and had asumption of risk been determined to be the basis of injury in that case, there would
have been no right of recovery. In that case it was argued
that the deceased employe chose an unsafe way of doing a
particular job when a safe place was equally available to
him. In connection with this and upon the point of assumption of risk, the Kentucky Appellate Court said :

"* * * the decision of this and other courts
hold that the failure to choose the safe, instead of an
unsafe way, is contributory negligence, and not assumed risk; and hence, under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act does not bar a recovery, but is to be
considered by the jury in diminution of the damages."
We do not think the argument of assumption of risk merits
any further discussion.
With respect to the obligation on the ·part of an employe to use reasonable care to choose a safe way when
there is more than one way available, we would like to refer
the court to the following authorities :
The text Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (1941
Edition) at page 332, states as a general rule that it is a
well settled rule of law that a voluntary choice of an unsafe method of procedure when a safe way is open and
obvious, c~nstitutes contributory negligence.
This question has been presented to this ·court in a
prior case and was passed upon by this. court in the case of
Raymond v. Union Pacific R. Co., ... Utah ... , 191 P·. (2d)
137. That was not a Federal Employers' Liability Act case
but did involve a man with railroad experience handling
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the switching of cars at the Remington Arms Plant at Salt
Lake City for the federal government. The facts of that
case showed that the plaintiff employe chose an unsafe way
to do his work when a safe way was available to him. The
trial court held him guilty of negligence as a matter of
law and upon that point this court sustained the trial court
by giving only the following short statement:
"The obvious truth from plaintiff's own testimony is that he gave no thought to his own safety.
I-I e placed his hand in a position which he knew to
be dangerous, when there was a safe method open to
him. The court below correctly held that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law."
In the case at bar the court did not hold the plaintiff to be
guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but instructed the
jury that where an employe has two ways of performing
an act, the one safe and the other dangerous, if he as a reasonable man should have discovered that one was safe and
the other dangerous, he owed a duty to use reasonable and
ordinary care to use the safe way. The court told the jury
that if they found that the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care would have discovered· that one
way was safer than the other, but nevertheless, if he did
not do that which he as a reasonable and prudent man should
have done, the jury could find him guilty of negligence.
See also

Groome v. City of Statesville, (N. C.) 177 S. E.
638.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ghee's Admx., (Va.)
66 S. E. 826.
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Harrison v. Myers Construction Co., (8th C. C.
A.) 42 F. (2d) 950.
Balente v. Lindner, (Pa.) 17 A. (2d) 371.
Snrith v. City of Pittsburg, (Pa.) 12 A. (2d) 788.
Wolfe v. Henwood, 162 F. (2d) 998.
Uzich v. E. & G. Brooke Iron Co., 76 Fed. Supp.
788.
We submit that plaintiff's charge of error in his statement of point 7 and as argued under his Point V should
be denied and decided adversely to appellant.
POINT VI
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE, EITHER UNCONTROVERTED OR OTHERWISE, AS PRESENTED
AT THE TRIAL.
In arg~ing under their Point VI counsel for appepant
do not indicate just which particular statement of error
they address their remarks to. We assume, but are not sure,
that counsel must refer to statement of error No. 10 wherein they charge the trial court with error in refusing to
grant plaintiff's motion for· new trial after the second trial.
At this point counsel for appellant repeat the statement
of their theory of the case and also give a considerable
amount of repetition of the facts in the case. On page 75
of appellant's brief they state:
"Plaintiff sincerely contends that the evidence,
as herein outlined, was sufficient for the court to
have granted a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of defendant's neglect as a contributing cause of plaintiff's injuries * * *"
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We are surprised at counsel's attitude and can only say
this is a good example of a situation where counsel become
so convinced of their own thoughts upon a subject and of
the truth of the testimony given by their own witnesses that
they cannot conceive that anybody would contradict them,
or that any contradictory evidence that might have been
produced was worthy of belief by either court or jury.
At this point we must remind counsel for the plaintiff
that even the jury in the first case which rendered an
original verdict for the entire amount which plaintiff had
asked held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, at least to the extent of 40 percent. The court,
after having heard the entire case and after having considered it for sometime after the trial, and after having
heard arguments upon the motion for a new trial, stated
that he had become convinced since the trial that he had
erred in not granting the motion for directed verdict, thus
in effect stating he had concluded that the defendant was
not negligent in failing to remove all ice and snow from
the ties. At any rate, he stated that in his opinion the plaintiff was guilty of more than the 40 percent of the total
negligence.
We would have to conclude from counsel's argument
under appellant's Point V that counsel for appellant feel
that there ·was no basis for submitting to the jury the question of whether or not plaintiff was guilty of any contributory negligence at all, in spite of the fact that all of the
defendant's witnesses testified that it was not proper to
attempt to throw the switch from a position where the
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switchman '\vould be standing on the ties. Now in Point
VI counsel argue that the court should have directed averdict for plaintiff on the question of defendant's n~gligence.
Therefore, the only logical conclusion that could follow from
counsel's argument is that the court should have decided
the question of negligence on behalf of both parties adversely to defendant as a matter of law and submitted the
matter to the jury solely upon the question as to how much
damage the plaintiff had sustained. Would counsel argue
as a result of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the lVilkerson case that instead of directing a
verdict for the defendant, the trial court should have directed
a verdict for the plaintiff Wilkerson? In that case there
were two places where Wilkerson could have walked in
performing his work, and the trial court directed a verdict
in favor of the railroad company because another and safer
place was available where plaintiff should have walked.
The Supreme Court of the United States did not say that
because of the fact that the jury might have found that
Wilkerson acted as a reasonable man in walking across
the board where he walked that therefore the defendant
should be found guilty of negligence as a matter of law, nor
that Wilkerson should be found to be free of negligence as
a matter of law. The United State Supreme Court said that
under the circumstances it was for the jury to decide whether the defendant was negligent in leaving the greasy board
available so that Wilkerson could walk on it, not that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and the United
States Supreme Court also held that Wilkerson's voluntary
choice and decision to walk across the greasy board could
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have been considered by the jury in determining whether
or not Wilkerson was guilty of contributory negligence.
Just so in the case at bar, in applying the Wilkerson
case to this case, it may be that the trial court considered
that he would not hold the defendant to be free from negligence as a matter of law because there was ice on these
switch ties, even though the evidence was in conflict as to
whether or not it was proper to stand on the ties when
manipulating the switch although a safer and more normal
place on the gravel ballast was available. Just so in this
case also, the trial court s~bmitted to the jury the question
as to whether or not Williams, in choosing to stand on the
switch ties to manipulate the switch, acted as a reasonable
man or whether he was negligent in so doing. The Wilkerson case is direct authority for such submission.
I

As a crowning point in counsel's solicitousness of their
client, we refer to their statement on page 74 of appellant's
brief, where it is stated:

"* * * Sixteen hours had elapsed during
which time the switch tender on duty could have
taken a shovel out to the area of the switch stand
and cleaned it, * * *"

--

yes, the court instructed the jury that the defendant
would be responsible for the negligence of its employes, and
if other employes were negligent the plaintiff could take
advantage of that fact. It is true that ~here were two switch
tenders on duty after the plaintiff had left his duty the day
before, and plaintiff's counsel now as a final shot say that
because of that 16 hours that had elapsed.with two shifts of
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switch tenders who succeeded plaintiff at his post, one or
the other of those switch tenders should have taken a shovel
out to the S\vitch stand and cleaned it. In saying so do
counsel recognize the fact that it is equally true that the
, plaintiff himself could have taken either the shovel or the
broom out to the switch stand and could, with one swath,
have removed all snow and slush from the ties (he could
not have dried it out anymore than defendant could). Plain- tiff was at work for a couple of hours after the storm had
= ceased and there was no more snow during the following
: 16 hours. Plaintiff did not think it was necessary to clean
~ this snow avvay, yet he wants to charge the other employes
: and the defendant with negligence because they did not
~ determine it to be l!ecessary.

Here it is interesting to note just what the eviden~e
shows with respect to circumstances surrounding this area.
:: Exhibit "L" introduced by plaintiff shows that the total
::. amount of the water equivalent of the precipitation from
midnight of December 7 to midnight of December 8 was
0.06 inches; that during this same period there was a total
~ of 1.0 inches snowfall. The depth of the snow on the ground
:: at midnight December 7 was 5.2 inches, and yet with an
additional inch of snowfall thereafter, the depth of snow
~ on the ground at midnight on December 8 was 2.0 inches.
~ On December 9 there was no precipitation, and the depth
:i· of snow on the ground at midnight December 9 was 1.0
~~ inches. During the three days in question the temperature
:~ranged from a minimum of 29° F., which was reached some§J· time after the accident occurred, to a maximum of 42° F.,
J
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which was reached on midafternoon of December 8, as
shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "M". Thus, as shown by Exhibit "L", the depth of snow on the ground at the time of
plaintiff's injury was something less than, or at least not
in excess of two inches-the depth at midnight December
8. In fact, we could assume that it was something less than
that because at midnight on December 8 the temperature
stood at 34 o F., and thereafter for the seven hours plus until
plaintiff was injured, the temperature ranged from one to
three degrees above freezing, and there would have been
some additional melting of this snow. Should the railroad
company, being charged with acting as a reasonable person
would act under the circumstances, have anticipated that
during such wet, snowy weather, with the snow melting
fast and with only two inches of snow on the ground at the
time of the accident, that such condition would have been
in any way hazardous to an experienced switchman in going
from switch to switch and manipulating them, where gravel
ballast is provided for such a switchman to walk and stand
on and where the melting snows do not puddle to freeze but
seep away in such ballast (R. 78-1) ?
We question very much whether the defendant could be
charged with negligence in the first instance here. We
think that there was as much ground, if not more of a proper
basis, for directing a verdict in favor of the defendant in
this case than there was in the Wilkerson case. In this
country and this particular area 'Ye are met in our daily life
every winter with icy conditions, and with such conditions
which might change in a few minutes. People in their normal
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everyday walks of life during winter weather have occasions
where they must walk and work in snow to a depth of two
inches, or more, very often.
Here again it is interesting to note the evidence produced over the signature of plaintiff and appellant Williams
himself. Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 were statements taken by thr~e
separate indivduals, all of which were signed by Williams,
and in connection with each of which over his signature,
and before signing, vV1lliams stated that he had read the
same and that it was true. The matters contained in Exhibit
5, according to testimony which was uncontradicted (since
appellant's counsel have chosen to refer to uncontradicted
testimony), were matters that were taken in shorthand
verbatim as Mr. Williams stated it (R. 189-191-2). In that
statement 'Villiams said:
"There were several inches of snow on the
ground at this location, but in the vicinity of this
switch it had been cleaned away but there was a
light covering of ice on the ties which was covered
with frost and this is what caused me to slip. There
was no defective condition of the switch, roadbed
or ties or anything else that I know of that contributed to this injury, was merely a case of me
slipping due to this light covering of ice and frost."
We particularly want the court to remember this statement with respect to frost, and this statement was signed
just four days after the accident.
Exhibit 6, also a statement, was taken by one of the
railroad claim agents over two months after the accident
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in plaintiff's home and witnessed by his daughter. In that
statement the plaintiff said:
"There was nothing whatsoever defective about
the switch stand or the ties or in fact the·re was
nothing about any of the equipment which caused
or contributed to my injury * * *
"There was nothing that the 0. U. R. & D. or
any of its servants could have done to have prevented this accident. It is just one of those accidents
that happens and as I put it the Great Almighty himself was responsible for what happened to me."
The statement, Exhibit 7, was taken by another claim
agent almost a year after the accident and not long before
filing of the complaint, and in that statement Williams said:
"The condition which I think had something to
do with my injury was the fact that the ties and
irons were all ice-coated, but the cinders and gravel
were not icy as the water had went through them."
At the trial of the case counsel for plaintiff belabored
and berated the claim agents for taking such statements,
and we recognize the fact that not only attorneys in such
cases, but even judges from the bench, have taken their
turn in criticizing claim agents. Nevertheless with respect
to these statemep.ts the plaintiff said, referring to Exhibit
5 (R. 129-2) :
"Q.

"A.
pened, I
"Q.

right in
"A.

Was what was written there the truth?
Yes, that is true. Just exactly how it haptold the truth all the way through.
All right, Exhibit 6 that Mr. Hills took
your bed room was that the truth?
Yes, sir that is the truth too."
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Those statements reflect the attitude and opinion that
Williams had before his attorneys filed his complaint for
him, and after two trials, at the conclusion of the second
trial as just referred to, Mr. ,~Villiams emphatically said
that it \Yas still the truth (R. 129-2).
The plaintiff himself did not think that the situation
surrounding the accident was such as to cause any reasonable man concern. It had stopped snowing nearly three
hours before he left shift on the 8th day of December, and
the only amount of precipitation that there was at all on
the 8th consisted of light snow showers during the forenoon of the 8th as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "M", and
during the whole of that time that precipitation amounted
to only one inch total snowfall, with a water content of .06
inches. With respect to this on the 8th, Williams did not
know when the sectionmen came to clean the snow away.
He said: "They had cleared it away previous to this day
on several occasions when we had had a snow;". and then
he added: "I don't remember of them being there on the
morning of the 8th, no, sir because there wasn't enough
snow there right in the morning to I don't think call to
their attention but they'd come down later in the afternoon,
maybe after I had gone off shift" (R. 94-2). Thus even
the plaintiff himself did not think there was enough snow
there to call their- attention to it on the morning of the 8th,
and he did not know whether or not they had yet cleared it
off.
Suppose the railroad company had removed all of the
snow from the switch ties. What would a reasonable man
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anticipate? If during stormy weather such as then existed
the weather got down to freezing, there would be frost on
the ties in the early morning even if there were no ice at all
on the ties, and such frost would make them slick. Suppose
there had been no snow at all but merely normal frost on
the ties the morning of the accident. Would the plaintiff
Williams claim that the defendant had the responsibility
of removing the frost and drying out the ties for him? What
reasonable care could a person take in eliminating such
condition of frost to remove a slippery condition from the
ties? Such frost would make the ties slippery and no amount
of reasonable care or foresight on the part of any individual
. could protect a workman, but a reasonable man should be
allowed to anticipate that an employe in the position that
Williams was in would act as a reasonable man and would
stand on the gravel ballast rather than on the frosty ties.
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT BOUND TO ANTICIPATE
THAT AN EMPLOYE WILL ACT NEGLIGENTLY AND
PROVIDE AGAINST· SUCI-I NEGLIGENCE IN ADVANCE.

It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff, with three
switches to take care of, had to cross the river bridge in
walking between them. It could just as well be argued that
the defendant company was under the obligation not only
of cleaning all snow away but of drying a path for plaintiff
wherever he had to walk or work, as also to do the same
with respect to other employes. Such an attitude would require not only the clearing away of all snow from all of the
Ogden yard, but would also require the drying of the yard
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in some manner so that residual wetness on the ground
would not freeze, or so that the atmosphere, containing
moisture as it does under such stormy conditions, would
not condense in frost upon iron rails or wooden ties in the
morning such as was the case here. The absurdity of such
a proposition is a sufficient answer. An employer is not
the insurer of the safety of his employes while they are on
duty, and an employer is not required to eliminate all danger, Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 329 U. S. 649, and
an employe can be presumed to be a reasonable man and held
to act as such.
We assume that counsel will again cry out that by
such a statement we are again reviving the doctrine of assumption of risk. The doctrine of assumption of risk a pplied to risks that are attendant upon or inherent in a particular type of work, and it was- never held in any of the
cases nor assumed by the courts that the question of assumption of risk applied where the risks, if such they could be
called, were not peculiar to the work itself, but only conditions which were normal to an area and which all people
living in the area met in their day-to-day work or in going
to and fro, whether at work or not.
Williams had already crossed over the Weber river
bridge, and the bridge was icy and he had to be careful
going across (R. 79-2). Williams had also had to walk on
some sort of a path between the three switches, and plaintiff's Exhibit I shows something of the nature of the pathway followed by plaintiff between the switch shanty and
the switch where the injury occurred. It appears that there
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is a spot or two of ice on the boards leading from the switch
· shanty. Should the defendant have likewise cleaned and
dried those boards? Should the defendant have cleaned all
snow and dried a path between that switch shanty and
switch 2, different than the path appears in plaintiff's
Exhibit I? Should the defendant have cleared all the spots
of melting snow and in some manner removed all of the
residual wetness from the ties shown in Exhibit 10? This
Exhibit 10 shows where plaintiff had to walk in crossing
from the switch shanty to switch number 2. Defendant's
Exhibit 8 shows something of the circumstances surrounding the switch stand where the injury occurred. The picture
is looking to the west and is taken opposite to where Williams should have stood in manipulating the switch, and
Williams testified that he did stand to the west or opposite
side of the switch from the view shown in the picture when
he first manipulated it (R. 51-52-2 and 82-2), and it appears
that there was gravel ballast which would have given him
good footing.
Counsel argue on page 74 of their brief that it. was
uncontroverted that ice covered the switch ties and the
"ice and snow covered the area around the switch stand."
Counsel misstate the record. Defendant's witness John E. 0.
Burton, who appears in the picture Exhibit I, states with
reference to ice on the ties: "There wasn't ice, there was
particles of snow that had partly melted and froze but it
was not covered with ice" ( R. 185-2). The plaintiff himself
confirmed this, both in his testimony and his statement,
Exhibit 7, above referred to wherein he said that "the
cinders and gravel were not icy."
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In connection 'vith this matter and as an answer to
plaintiff's argument, while \Ve think the Wilkerson case is a
sufficient and a direct answer thereto, we would like to call ?~ L. Ed. J!J
the court's attention to the case of ftlissouri Pacific Railroad
~r
et.111
Co. v. Aeby, 275 U. S. 426. In that case the United States
Supreme Court reversed a judgment against the railroad
company on a basis that no negligence had been shown, and
while the case was decided prior to the change in the law
with respect to assumption of risk, the court in its opinion
excluded the question of assumption of risk from its decision.
That case involved an agent in the employ of the defendant
railroad company and involved slipping on an icy path where
the circumstances were much stronger against the railroad
company than in the case at bar. Water had dripped from
the eaves of the depot building and had accumulated in a
depression on the gravelled "platform". This depression was
near the door entrance to the waiting room and was about
four inches deep. The depression had been there for some
time. "During the night it rained, froze and snowed." Ice
had formed in this depression and then it was covered with
snow. The employe went out and passed over the spot once
but when returning to the waiting room slipped, fell and
was injured.

s.

In holding that the railroad company was not negligent
the United States· Supreme Court said:
"This case is governed by the Act and the applicable principles of common law as established and
applied in federal courts. There is no liability in the
absence of negligence on the part of the carrier.
* * * Its duty in respect of the platform did not
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make petitioner an insurer of respondent's safety;
there was no guaranty that the place would be absolutely safe. The measure of duty in such cases is
reasonable care having regard to the circumstances.
* * * The petitioner was not required to have
any particular type or kind of platform or to maintain it in the safest and best possible condition.
* * * No employment is free from danger.
Fault or negligence on the part of petitioner may
not be inferred from the mere fact that respondent
fell and was hurt. She knew that it had rained and
that the place was covered with ice and snow. Her
knowledge of the situation and of whatever danger
existed was at least equal to that chargeable against
the petitioner. Petitioner was not required to give
her warning. * * * It is a matter of common
knowledge that almost everywhere there are to be
found in public ways and on private grounds numerous places in' general use by pedestrians that in
similar weather are not materially unlike the place
where respondent fell. Under the circumstances, it
cannot reasonably be held that failure of petitioner
to remove the snow and ice violated) any duty owed
to her. * * *" (Italics ours.)
Again we state, the Supreme Court decided that case
on the ground of lack of negligence and stated with respect
to petitioner: "we need not consider its contentions in
respect of assumption of risk and negligence on the part
of respondent."
We would like also to refer the court to the case of
Wolfe v. Henwood, (Eighth Circuit) 162 F. (2d) 998. The
plaintiff, a section hand, used gasoline to clean oil from
his clothes, which he got on in the course of his work. He
went to dispose of some old gasoline which he had thus used,
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lit a match which caught fire to his glove, and then he
slapped his leg with the glove, the gasoline on his trousers
caught fire, and he burned to death.
After a verdict had been granted to the plaintiff, the
trial court granted judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. This was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court, and we quote from the opinion :
"The defendant had the duty to use reasonable
care to furnish Wolfe a safe place in which to perform his work. * * * But defendant's obligation was not such as to impose liability for injury regardless of due care and regardless of whether the
injury was one reasonably to be anticipated or foreseen as a natural con.sequence of defendant's act.
* * * (Italics ours.)
" '* * * the employer's liability is to be determined under the general rule which defines negligence as the lack of due care under the circumstances; or the failure to do what a reasonable and
prudent man would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances of the situation; or doing wh~t such
a person under the existing circumstances would not
have done. A fair generalization of the rule is given
in the Senate Committee report on the 1939 amendment: "In justice, the master ought to be held liable
for injuries attributable to conditioRs under his
control when they are not such as a reasonable man
ought to maintain in the circumstances." Of course
in any case the standard of care must be commensurate to the dangers of the business. * * *' "
Here we have a situation where on December 8 there
were only two inches of snow on the ground (Exhibit L) ;
and the weather in the main was considerably above freez-
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ing and had been continued wet and stormy. The section
hands had at least cleaned the major portion of the snow
away from the switch points, as well as an area on the
ballast to the west of the switch stand where they would
assume a switchman would stand. There was no ice or
frozen snow on this ballast, water from melting snow having
seeped away into the ballast (R. 211-2, Exhibit 7). In addition, a broom and hand shovel were available, and according to defendant's witness, they were as much a part
of a switchman's equipment as they were of a sectionman's
(R. 182, 186-187-1).
Unde-r the circumstances, the question should be whether the injury as occurred to Williams here was one "reasonably to be anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence
of defendant's act." Instead of being one that should have
been reasonably foreseen, we think there is a serious question that the accident even happened as alleged considering
the manner in which Williams claims to have fallen. He
stated that he fell to the east, although he states it was his
left leg which slipped and it slipped to the east. He had
his right hand on the switch stand and his left hand on the
lever to the west, and with his left leg slipping to the east he
would normally have fallen to the west. Considering
also the depth of the clearing between the two switch
ties where Williams stated that his leg went, there would
have been only six or seven inches, and the injury or break
suffered by Williams being at least double that distance
up from the bottom of his foot, we feel that we can say, as
was said by this court in the case of Pollari v. Salt Lake City,
111 Utah 25, 176 P. (2d) 111, at page 117:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

97

"Plaintiff's contention that the verdict is against
the great weight of the evidence is obviously without
foundation to anyone who reads the record. The improbability of the fall occurring as the plaintiff testified it did,'' (and other facts placed before the jury
and argued at length) "clearly support the verdict of
no cause of action."
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that Judge Hendricks
could have granted a new trial without requiring any remission from the original jury's verdict, and he did not
commit error in granting the new trial on the basis used
by him.
Plaintiff's theory was fully presented and argued at
length upon every point claimed by appellant's counsel, and
the trial court did not commit error either in the giving of
instructions, nor refusing to , give Instructions No. 4 and
No. 5 requested by the plaintiff, nor in refusing plaintiff's
request for a new trial.
We therefore respectfully submit that the verdict of
the jury and the judgment of the court thereon, including
the order of the court denying the motion for new trial,
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,

Counsel for Defendant
and Respondent.
10 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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